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The debate among legal scholars about individuals' failure to save
enough for retirement adopts a "micro" perspective. It focuses on the causes
and consequences of undersaving from the perspective of individuals and
analyzes how legal interventions, such as tax subsidies and nudges, can best
address individual saving mistakes. This debate depends on certain
assumptions about how the macroeconomy operates. When these assumptions
do not hold, neither do the implications of the micro analysis, turning the
conventional analysis of undersaving on its head. In fact, in certain
circumstances, saving imposes a negative externality. When this is true, what
looks like undersaving at the individual level may constitute oversaving in the
aggregate, and the private vice of overconsumption may in fact be a public
virtue-the "paradox of thrift." We adopt a macro perspective and argue for
reforms of legal interventions designed to increase savings.
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Introduction
The problem of individuals' failure to save enough for retirement during
their working years is a persistent policy concern and the subject of a large
literature in tax law and behavioral law and economics.I The premise of this
literature is that individuals, like the improvident grasshopper in Aesop's
Fables, do not make the sacrifices during the summer of their working years to
ensure that there will be enough for them to eat during the winter of their
retirement.2
This commonplace view about the tendency of people to pursue
immediate gratification at the expense of their future selves is now grounded in
particular psychological theories of how people decide how much of their
income to save. One theory posits that individuals are impulsive and prefer to
consume now rather than save for later, even if doing so is against their best
interests.3 Another theory is that individuals are passive, failing to take even the
small steps necessary to set aside savings now for future consumption, not
because they are impatient but merely because they are lazy.4
1. See, e.g., Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its
Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L. REV. 1593, 1607 (2014); William J. Congdon et al., Behavioral Economics
and Tax Policy, 62 NAT'L TAX J. 375, 377, 382-83 (2009); David Kamin, Getting Americans To Save:
In Defense of (Reformed) Tax Incentives, 70 TAX L. REV. (forthcoming 2017) (manuscript at 3-8),
http://ssrn.com/abstract=2865587; Richard H. Thaler & Shlomo Benartzi, Save More Tomorrow: Using
Behavioral Economics To Increase Employee Saving, 112 J. POL. ECON. Sl 64, S166 (2004); Joshua D.
Wright & Douglas H. Ginsburg, Behavioral Law and Economics: Its Origins, Fatal Flaws, and
Implications for Liberty, 106 Nw. U. L. REV. 1033, 1056-57 (2012).
2. Aesop, The Ant and the Scarab Beetle, in THE COMPLETE FABLES 177 (Olivia &
Robert Temple trans., Penguin Books 1998). The Ant, disciplined as she is, is able to save for her
retirement without government intervention. "Go to the ant, thou sluggard; consider her ways, and be
wise: which having no guide, overseer or ruler, provideth her meat in the summer, and gathereth her
food in the harvest." Proverbs 6: 6-8 (King James).
3. See, e.g., David I. Laibson, Andrea Repetto & Jeremy Tobacman, Self-Control and
Saving for Retirement, 1998 BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY 91, 93-95; Abi Adams et al.,
Consume Now or Later? Time Inconsistency, Collective Choice, and Revealed Preference, 104 AM.
ECON. REV. 4147, 4148 (2014); Terrance K. Martin Jr. et al., Do Retirement Planning Strategies Alter
the Effect of Time Preference on Retirement Wealth, 23 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 1003, 1003 (2016).
4. See, e.g., Annamaria Lusardi, Information, Expectations, and Saving for
Retirement, in BEHAVIORAL DIMENSIONS OF RETIREMENT ECONOMICS 81 (Henry Aaron ed., 1999); Raj
Chetty et al., Active vs. Passive Decisions and Crowd-Out in Retirement Savings Accounts: Evidence




These failures of individual rationality as traditionally conceived lead to
either a situation where society steps in to support individuals in their
retirement (in which case the undersaving imposes an "externality" on others)
or a situation where those individuals are simply left to deal with the adverse
consequences of their impatience or laziness (in which case the undersaving
imposes an "internality" on the individual herself). Just as market failures are
thought to justify government intervention, so do failures of rationality. Hence,
scholars and policymakers make a variety of recommendations to use law to
encourage saving.
Framed in these terms, legal scholarship in this area has taken a "micro"
perspective on the problem of undersaving; it focuses on the problems of
individual rationality that lead to suboptimal decision making at the individual
level. From this perspective, the best policy is one that will cause individuals to
save enough during their working years to finance the correct amount of their
own consumption in retirement. But legal and policy interventions apply to
more than just one individual, and their consequences can aggregate to generate
large effects for the economy as a whole. When this happens, interventions
designed to change individuals' savings decisions may feed back into, and
change, the economic environment in which those decisions are made,
potentially upending policy conclusions that are drawn without taking these
effects into account.
The micro perspective tends to neglect the aggregate effects of individual
savings decisions on the economic environment. The contribution of this
Article is to introduce a macro perspective to the legal scholarship on savings
policy design and to discuss the trade-off between micro and macro objectives.
A macro approach to such problems is well-established in economics and is
beginning to gain momentum in Law & Economics scholarship.7 From this
perspective, we argue that remedies for problems of individual rationality do
not translate so easily into sensible policies of general applicability. This
problem is especially acute in the economic and political conditions that have
persisted in developing economies around the world since the 2008 global
Plan Rules, Participant Decisions, and the Path of Least Resistance, 16 TAX POL'Y & ECON., 67, 70
(2002); Thaler & Benartzi, supra note 1, at S 169.
5. See Brian Galle, Tax, Command or Nudge: Evaluating the New Regulation, 92 TEX.
L. REV. 837, 843-47, 880-83 (2013); Donald B. Marron, Should We Tax Internalities Like Externalities?
I (Tax Pol'y Center, Urban Inst. and Brookings Institution Working Paper, 2015),
http://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications/should-we-tax-internalities-externalities/full.
6. Absent some sort of market failure, and assuming certain other technical conditions
are satisfied, any competitive market equilibrium is Pareto optimal, meaning that no one can be made
better off without someone being made worse off. See ANDREU MAS-COLELL ET AL., MICROECONOMIC
THEORY 308 (1995). From a welfare economics perspective, the presence of a market failure is
necessary to make a prima facie case for government intervention.
7. See Yair Listokin, Law and Macroeconomics: The Law and Economics of
Recessions, 34 YALE J. ON REG. 791 (2017); Yair Listokin, A Theoretical Framework for Law and
Macroeconomics (Yale Law Sch. Pub. Law Res. Paper No. 586, Yale Law & Econ. Res. Paper No. 567,
2016), http://papers.ssrn.com/abstract-2860283.
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financial crisis, which have been characterized by interest rates hovering close
to zero, below-capacity economic production, and governments that are
reluctant to increase direct spending to stimulate job growth and household
incomes. In this environment, where political paralysis and an aversion to
increasing budget deficits makes traditional fiscal stimulus infeasible, and low
interest rates hamstring monetary policy's effectiveness, we argue that
individual savings impose a negative externality on other individuals, and the
last thing the law should be doing is to encourage that saving. The more that
some individual saves, the less income that other individuals have to spend and
consume themselves. This is John Maynard Keynes's "paradox of thrift." When
this paradox holds, remedying the individual undersaving problem with a
generally applicable solution may make all individuals worse off, and the
private vice of over-spending may in fact be a public virtue through its effect
on other people's incomes.
We do not mean to argue that savings policy interventions should be the
first or even second place that policymakers turn to mitigate business cycle
fluctuations, and the circumstances in which we think the case for stimulating
demand by manipulating private consumption decisions have historically been
relatively rare. The paradox of thrift most clearly arises when interest rates
approach zero. In the ordinary course, consumption does not have a positive
income externality, or at least, it is much more controversial as a matter of
economic theory that it could. However, we believe that the confluence of a
deep recession, monetary policy that is effectively hamstrung by the zero lower
bound on interest rates, and a spirit of austerity that makes fiscal stimulus
infeasible, justifies looking elsewhere for sources of economic stimulus. The
Great Recession of the late 2000s ("Great Recession") had enormous and
persistent effects on economic welfare that we think warrant more creative
interventions than have historically been contemplated.
In Part I, we describe the micro perspective on the problem of
undersaving. We show that the micro approach generally adopts the perspective
of individual decision makers and tailors policies to help make savings
decisions that those individuals, by their own lights, judge to be better for
themselves. In Part II, we show that the micro perspective relies implicitly on
certain idealized assumptions about how the economy works, such as that
household savings lead to increases in business investment, and that these
assumptions often do not hold, and, in fact, did not hold for nearly a decade
following the onset of the Great Recession. When these assumptions do not
hold, neither do many conclusions about how to best address undersaving. Part
III provides the main exposition of our argument: in a world that differs from
the stylized assumptions of neoclassical economics and in which legislators and
regulators are unable to achieve first-best policies, savings may impose a
negative externality on other individuals. In this second-best world, helping all
individuals achieve the best outcome from their individualistic perspectives




everyone. In Part IV, we defend the claim that private spending on
consumption is sometimes necessary to generate the income externalities that
make all individuals better off, because economic and political constraints rule
out alternative policies. We also make specific suggestions about how to reform
savings policy interventions. Specifically, we argue that policy during
economic downturns should remove incentives for people to contribute money
to tax-deferred retirement accounts and make it easier for them to take money
out. More generally, savings policy should encourage less (not more) savings
during deep recessions, particularly among the wealthy and among those who
are not psychologically biased against saving.
I. Savings Policy: A Micro Perspective
A. Should the Law Encourage Saving?
Federal and state governments encourage individuals to save their income
through a variety of mechanisms. These mechanisms include a preferential tax
rate for certain income earned on the returns from savings,8 the deferral of tax
on income invested or generated within 401(k) plans and Individual Retirement
Accounts (IRAs), mandated savings in the form of Social Security
contributions, tax credits for income saved by low-income households,9 and
"behavioral" interventions such as enrolling new employees in retirement plans
by default. Why is so much effort devoted to increasing savings by individuals?
There are three justifications for legal interventions into savings decisions.
The first justification is that private savings are invested by the institutions
where they are deposited and investment leads to increased economic growth,
which is good for everyone.10 On this view, the more money that is deposited
with banks, the more those banks will lend to businesses to invest in new
projects that will employ people to produce goods and services. Further, the
more money that is invested in the stocks and securities of private firms, the
lower the cost to those firms of raising capital and the more projects they will
be willing to undertake. This justification is a macro justification, in the sense
that growth is an objective for a country, not an individual. Of course, growth
redounds to the benefit of individuals, but economic output is an aggregate
8. Preferential rates are applicable to "net capital gain," which includes certain
dividends. I.R.C. § 1(h) (2012).
9. I.R.C. § 25B.
10. The objective of increasing growth through savings/capital accumulation is in the
background, if not the foreground, of many tax policy decisions. See, e.g., U.S. TREAS. DEP'T,
BLUEPRINT FOR TAX REFORM 10 (1977) (describing a consumption tax, noting that "[b]y eliminating
disincentives to saving, the cash flow tax would encourage capital formation, leading to higher growth
rates and more capital per worker and higher before-tax wages").
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variable that is not always explicitly tied to individual measures of well-
being.11
The second justification for intervention into the private savings decisions
of individuals derives from the claim that those individuals do not invest as
much as they should, even in their own judgment. On this account, failures of
individual rationality interact with the decisions of market participants and the
environment in which people make their savings decisions to cause people to
undersave. Thus, interventions to increase savings are helping people help
themselves.12 This is a "micro" justification, explicitly grounded in the welfare
of individuals and how they make decisions.
The third justification is also a microeconomic justification for savings
interventions, but is implied by the fact that "undersaving" can sometimes be
rational from an individual perspective. The existence of social welfare
programs that provide income and in-kind support to low-income elderly
individuals can create an incentive for people to save less than they otherwise
would to maximize their benefits from these social welfare programs. On this
view, undersaving is rational for the individual but has pernicious effects in the
aggregate; it is a moral hazard problem that admits the possibility of a legal fix.
In the remainder of this Part, we describe in detail the nature of micro
justifications, which have dominated legal scholarship's approach to savings
policy. We begin by examining the evidence for the claim that individuals
undersave and then briefly summarize the causes of undersaving and the
policies that have been adopted to address the problem.13 This description sets
the stage for Part II, where we show that arguments about savings policy that
are generated from within the micro framework, although valid on their terms,
are sensitive to background assumptions about the operation of the
macroeconomy and the political system that often do not hold. When they do
not hold, the arguments are unsound. We then describe how more realistic
assumptions about the economy and the political environment challenge both
the received wisdom of the micro approach and the growth-based justification
for increasing private savings.
11. More precisely, it is often assumed in the economics literature that there is a single
"representative agent" for the economy and the government is interested in maximizing the long-term
welfare of that individual. See Raj Chetty et al., Are Micro and Macro Labor Supply Elasticities
Consistent? A Review of Evidence on the Intensive and Extensive Margins, 101 AM. ECON. REV. 471,
473 (2011) ("Most macro studies [of labor supply responses to taxes] calibrate representative agent
models."). when the analysis allows individuals to differ in their preferences or income levels, policy
conclusions become more complicated. For example, economic growth can in some cases be harmful for
large subsets of the population. See Daniel Murphy, Welfare Consequences ofAsymmetric Growth, 126
J. ECON. BEHAV. ORG. 1, 13 (2016).
12. See Amy B. Monahan, Addressing the Problem ofImpatients, Impulsives and Other
Imperfect Actors in 401(k) Plans, 28 VA. TAX REV. 471 (2004); Susan J. Stabile, Freedom To Choose
Unwisely: Congress' Misguided Decision To Leave 401(k) Plan Participants to Their Own Devices, II
CORNELL J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 361 (2001); Cass R. Sunstein & Richard H. Thaler, Libertarian
Paternalism Is Not an Oxymoron, 70 U. CHI. L. REV. 1159 (2003).
13. For a more comprehensive treatment, see Daniel Shaviro, Multiple Myopias,




1. Do Individuals Save Enough?
The claim that individuals' retirement savings are insufficient must be
based on someone's notion of how much saving is enough.14 One candidate for
that someone is the individual herself. We could collect evidence of
undersaving by comparing how much someone saves with statements about
how much she would like to save. Alternatively, we might adopt some
normative model for how much savings is enough, and compare the amount
that a person saves with how much our model says that she ought to save. Both
approaches have challenges.
Suppose that we privilege the individual's own judgment of how much
savings is enough. When should we ask them to offer that judgment? When
asked in advance, people often intend to save more than they end up saving,
but this may be because they underestimate or are surprised by the magnitude
of certain expenses, such as those associated with medical emergencies or
homeownership, that make saving impossible. In these cases, presumably if
people were aware of these costs when they were asked how much they wanted
to save they would have reported a lower savings target.
When asked after the fact, people often regret not having saved more
during their working years. 16 But mere expressions of regret must be
interpreted carefully. Someone might wish that their younger self had saved
more not because she thinks that her younger self made a mistake, but simply
because she does not adequately value the well-being of her earlier self. There
is abundant evidence that people undervalue the welfare of their future selves. 17
But when someone is deciding how to value the welfare of her future self, at
least she must worry about the fact that she will at some point become that
future self, and this will discourage her from entirely devaluing the well-being
of that future self. But the fact that she will never be her younger self again, and
will never have to experience the consequences of what she wishes her younger
self had done, means that we should probably take at least some statements
about the sacrifice she wishes she had made in the past with a large grain of
salt.
14. For a recent synthesis of the literature, see Jonathan Skinner, Are You Sure You're
Saving Enough for Retirement?, 21 J. ECON. PERSP. 3 (2007).
15. See B. Douglas Bernheim, Do Households Appreciate Their Financial
Vulnerabilities? An Analysis ofActions, Perceptions, and Public Policy, in TAX POLICY AND ECONOMIC
GROWTH 1 (1995); James J. Choi et al., Saving for Retirement on the Path of Least Resistance, in
BEHAVIORAL PUBLIC FINANCE 304, 306 (Edward J. McCaffery & Joel Slemrod eds., 2006); John
Beshears et al., Simplification and Saving, 95 J. ECON. BEHAV. & ORG. 130, 144-45 (2013); James J.
Choi et al., Defined Contribution Pensions: Plan Rules, Participant Choices, and the Path of Least
Resistance, 16 TAX POL'Y & ECON. 67, 70 (2002); Laibson et al., supra note 3, at 93-94; Thaler &
Benartzi, supra note 1, at S 166-70.
16. See Claes Bell, Survey: Most Americans Have Financial Regrets, Particularly
About Saving, BANKRATE (May 17, 2016), http://www.bankrate.com/finance/consumer-index/financial-
security-charts-0516.aspx.
17. See, e.g., David Laibson, Golden Eggs and Hyperbolic Discounting, 112 Q.J. ECON.
443, 445-46 (1997).
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The person who says that they want to save for retirement just as they are
not doing so is perhaps the most puzzling case. If this person merely has some
unexpressed countervailing reason for not saving as much as she wants, such as
another pressing spending need, it would be wrong to conclude that she is
undersaving relative to her all-things-considered judgment about what is in her
best interests. The fact that she might like to save more if circumstances were
different is beside the point. But there are other reasons why people might not
do what they say that they want to do. For example, individuals who suffer
from self-control problems might feel irresistibly tempted to save less than they
would like. In this case, the person is fairly said to be undersaving relative to
her true preferences at that time, and we can ground the claim that an individual
is undersaving in the preferences of the individual herself.
It is hard to interpret a mismatch between stated expressions of saving
intentions and observed behavior. Asking more detailed questions might
resolve some of these difficulties, but unless an individual acts in ways that are
inconsistent with her stated preferences at all times, there remains the thorny
question of which vantage point to privilege as well as a general concern about
how much we can trust the credibility of such statements. The alternative
approach to identifying undersaving is to compare an individual's actual
savings decisions with some normative baseline that we think corresponds to
what is in that individual's best interests. The dominant baseline used in this
approach is one in which consumption tends to be relatively stable over time
and does not move in lockstep with income.
This baseline has some intuitive appeal. For many people, a sharp drop in
consumption around retirement would seem to be undesirable. Since one's
preferences, tastes, and habits are unlikely to change discontinuously at
retirement, it seems unlikely that one would want one's consumption to drop
off dramatically at that time. And yet, the Center for Retirement Research
estimated in 2013 that 52 percent of working age households were at risk of
being unable to maintain their pre-retirement standard of living in retirement, a
standard that we are meant to understand should be constant across the
retirement boundary.19 The normative pattern of savings and consumption, in
which consumption is relatively stable across years and does not vary too
closely with income, emerges from formal economic models of how
18. See Kamin, supra note 1, at 8-9.
19. NRRJ Update Shows Half Still Falling Short, CTR. FOR RETIREMENT RES. (last
visited Nov. 23, 2016), http://crr.bc.edu/briefs/nrri-update-shows-half-still-falling-short; see also David
Blanchett, Exploring the Retirement Consumption Puzzle, 27 J. FIN. PLAN. 34, 41-42 (2014); Michael
Hurd & Susann Rohwedder, The Retirement Consumption Puzzle: Anticipated and Actual Declines in
Spending at Retirement 17 (Nat'1 Bureau of Econ. Res., Working Paper No. 9586, 2003). But see Emma
Aguila et al., Changes in Consumption at Retirement: Evidence from Panel Data, 93 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 1094, 1098 (2011) (discussing their evidence that the retirement consumption puzzle does not





individuals should choose a pattern of savings and consumption.20 In these
models, each unit of consumption at a given point in time generates less benefit
than the previous unit. As a result, it will generally be undesirable for an
individual to consume a lot in one period and very little in another; she will
tend to be better off by moving some consumption from the period in which she
is already consuming a lot and the marginal benefit of the consumption is low,
to the period in which she is consuming little and the marginal benefit of
consumption is high. If an individual's taste for consumption is stable over
time, the model predicts that an individual should consume the same amount in
each period.
Despite its intuitive appeal, applying this abstract model to observed
patterns of consumption and saving is not straightforward. For one thing, as
David Kamin argues, there is rational variation in savings rates across
individuals within income groups at a point in time because of different life
21circumstances, suggesting that the taste for consumption may not be constant.
A second issue is that "consumption" must be measured broadly to include
forms of non-market consumption. Although we observe a drop-off in market
expenditures at retirement, we also observe a large increase in "home
production" at the same time. People begin to do for themselves tasks that they
previously paid others to do, such as prepare meals.22 Retired individuals need
to spend less on work-related expenditures (e.g., work clothes and
transportation), and they will also increase the amount of leisure they take,
another form of consumption. Therefore, the drop-off in measured expenditures
upon retirement is not necessarily indicative of lower consumption or well-
being in later years.23
Measures of nonmarket consumption must also include the psychic
benefits from anticipation and memory.24 For example, it would not be unusual
for an individual to save for a period of years to pay for a lavish vacation. On a
narrow view of consumption, this would appear to be inconsistent with the
simple model of consumption and savings sketched above. However, to
20. See MILTON FRIEDMAN, THEORY OF THE CONSUMPTION FUNCTION 20-37 (1957)
(discussing the permanent income hypothesis); Franco Modigliani & Richard Brumberg, Utility Analysis
and the Consumption Function: An Interpretation of Cross-Section Data, in POST KEYNESIAN
ECONOMICS 288 (Kenneth K. Kurihara ed., 1954) (describing the "life cycle" hypothesis of saving).
21. Kamin, supra note 1, at 20.
22. See Mark Aguiar & Erik Hurst, Consumption Versus Expenditure, 113 J. POL.
ECON. 919, 928 (2005).
23. If individuals were unrestricted in when they could work, then they might prefer to
work reduced hours their entire lives rather than work more hours for a limited duration. However, given
formal and informal market constraints imposed by employers, as well as physiological limitations, few
people are able to work their whole lives with the same intensity. Therefore, we necessarily observe
more leisure consumption late in life. This would tend to imply that it is rational for individuals to
purchase more market consumption during their working years.
24. See Botond K6szegi, Health Anxiety and Patient Behavior, 22 J. HEALTH ECON.
1073, 1081 (2003); Botond K6szegi, Utility from Anticipation and Personal Equilibrium, 44 ECON.
THEORY 415, 416 (2010); Itzhak Gilboa et al., Memory Utility 2-3 (PIER Working Paper No. 15-005,
2015), http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=2554491.
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properly evaluate the rationality of this consumption pattern within the model
we would need to know whether there were any "consumption" benefits from
looking forward to the vacation or from looking backward at the memory of the
trip. Someone in retirement has many years of such trips from which to derive
"memory utility."
The problems with identifying undersaving by comparing observed
consumption patterns with a normative baseline are not necessarily
insurmountable, but they should serve as a caution against too-quick
conclusions about what the micro perspective implies about the universal
necessity of increasing private savings and the magnitude that increase should
take. This caution, we believe, helps create room for considerations relevant to
savings policy from other perspectives, specifically, the macro perspective.
2. The Causes of Undersaving
If we accept the premise that individuals save less during their working
years than they need to finance an adequate level of market consumption in
retirement, we must then ask why that is. The most common explanation
offered by economists who study this phenomenon is that people tend to
discount the future costs and benefits of their actions more than even they think
appropriate, and, as a result, they have difficulty following through on even
well-laid plans.25 The basic story is a familiar one: people tend to procrastinate,
putting off unpleasant asks that they would be better off doing it immediately,
and people also tend to act impulsively, overeating and consuming to excess
even though they may reap significant negative consequences in the future.
These are not behaviors that one plans to engage in, and they are behaviors that
one regrets.
Saving, which is to say deferring consumption from the present to the
future, is difficult for such "present-biased" individuals to achieve because,
regardless of their initial retirement savings plans, when it comes time for them
to cut back on consumption to set aside money for the future they cannot resist
the temptation to consume now. On this account, undersaving is a mistake,
even by the individual's own lights. Economic models of present-bias emerge
from the behavioral economics literature in response to shortcomings in the
ability of the standard model, discussed above, to explain the close co-
25. Models of such "present-biased" individuals can explain the close co-movement of
income and consumption, particularly around retirement, that we observe in the data. See George-Marios
Angeletos et al., The Hyperbolic Consumption Model: Calibration, Simulation, and Empirical
Evaluation, 15 J. ECON. PERSP. 47, 55-59 (2001); David Laibson, Life-Cycle Consumption and
Hyperbolic Discount Functions, 42 EUR. ECON. REv. 861, 867-68 (1998); Laibson, supra note 17, at
454-56; Laibson et al., supra note 3, at 123; Giovanni Mastrobuoni & Matthew Weinberg,
Heterogeneity in Intra-Monthly Consumption Patterns, Self-Control, and Savings at Retirement, 1 AM.
ECON. J.: ECON. POL'Y 163, 186-87 (2009). So-called "mental accounting" can also predict the close
correlation of income and consumption. See Shaviro, supra note 13, at 1243; Richard H. Thaler,




movement of income and consumption over an individual's life. Whereas
traditional economic models predict that people discount the future a little bit,
relative to the present, they do not explain why people have such a hard time
sticking to their plans and behaving impulsively when doing so has such
significant effects in the future.
An alternative explanation is that people undersave not because it is a
mistake, but because of the existence of social welfare programs for the elderly.
Someone who knows that they will receive income support or consumption
benefits in retirement may not save as much for the future because they know
that they can fall back on the support of the state. This is simply an application
of the moral hazard argument from the provision of welfare benefits generally.
In the same way that unemployment insurance, food stamps, and assisted
housing may make work relatively less attractive,26 old-age income support
makes saving less attractive. The effect of this behavior is to externalize the
cost of undersaving on the rest of the population who must subsidize those who
do not save enough. Thus, what is rational from an individual's perspective
may be socially undesirable.
But, when we scrutinize this argument, things are not so straightforward.
A rational individual will save just enough income from her working years to
equalize the benefit of saving one more dollar of her income and the benefit of
using that dollar for current consumption. An individual who is assured some
consumption benefit in retirement will reduce the savings she otherwise would
have accumulated because she does not need to finance as much of her
retirement herself.27 Of course, someone must pay for that government benefit,
and if the funds come from taxes collected from the individual herself during
her working years, then the system merely functions as a form of forced
savings. The amount of income that an individual saves or consumes does not
affect the amount of her benefits from the government program in this kind of
arrangement, so there is no externality and no moral hazard. Social Security
and Medicare operate in this way: in neither case do an individual's benefits
depend on the amount of her savings.28
Medicaid and Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program ("SNAP")
benefits are generally unavailable to individuals with too much wealth, so
someone anticipating using these programs might save less than she would
26. See TAX FOUNDATION, UNEMPLOYMENT INSURANCE: TRENDS AND ISSUES 42-45
(1982); Eric M. Engen & Jonathan Gruber, Unemployment Insurance and Precautionary Saving, 47 J.
MONETARY EcON. 545, 572 (2001); Hugo A. Hopenhayn & Juan Pablo Nicolini, Optimal
Unemployment Insurance, 105 J. POL. ECON. 412, 413 (1997); Bruce D. Meyer, Unemployment
Insurance and Unemployment Spells, 58 ECONOMETRICA 757, 757 (1990).
27. In order to focus on the effect of government benefits on savings and consumption
during working years, we ignore the question of how these programs affect labor supply. This is
somewhat arbitrary because, as discussed above, the decision about how much to work affects the
amount of (leisure) consumption as well as the budget available for saving and spending.
28. Social Security beneficiaries with incomes above certain thresholds have to claim
some of their benefits as taxable income, and there are income-related premiums for certain Medicare
Parts. The returns on savings may be included in "income" in a way that may weaken this conclusion.
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otherwise prefer to maintain her eligibility for these programs in retirement.
But how big a concern is this? To be eligible for Medicaid the threshold level
of savings is $2,000, and for SNAP the threshold is $3,250.29 An individual
with a healthy income in her working years who decided not to save in order to
be eligible for Medicaid or SNAP in retirement would have to be willing to
tolerate an enormous drop in her standard of living to do so. This seems
unlikely. Moreover, there are other ways to manage one's affairs to satisfy the
asset tests for these programs, principally by transferring one's assets to family
members in the period before means-testing.30 It is much more likely that
forward-thinking individuals would engage in this sort of planning rather than
radically adjust their lifetime consumption expenditures. Thus, it seems
unlikely that retirement income support should induce a rational individual to
undersave,31 and that present-bias is more likely to be the cause of any
undersaving.
In the next section, we briefly discuss how the design features of legal
interventions into private savings decisions map to the underlying causes of
undersaving. We do this to describe their benefits, from the micro perspective,
so that they can be weighed in the balance when we introduce the macro
perspective.
B. How the Law Encourages Saving
In this subpart, we discuss how some of the most important policy
instruments used to address undersaving operate, from the micro perspective,
and connect them explicitly to models of the savings/consumption decision.32
As we argue in the rest of this Article, the micro perspective is not wrong,
merely incomplete. Our aim is simply to show how the additional
considerations introduced by the macro approach might change our evaluation
29. See Medicaid Eligibility: Financial Requirements-Assets, U.S. DEP'T HEALTH &
HUM. SERVS. (last visited July 1, 2017), http://longtermeare.acl.gov/medicare-medicaid-
more/medicaid/medicaid-eligibility/financial-requirements-assets.html; Supplemental Nutrition
Assistance Program (SNAP): Eligibility, U.S. DEP'T AGRIC. (last visited July 1, 2017),
http://www.fns.usda.gov/snap/eligibility.
30. See DEAN BAKER & HYE JIN RHO, THE POTENTIAL SAVINGS TO SOCIAL SECURITY
FROM MEANS TESTING 5 (2011); Tyler Cowen, Means Testing, for Medicare, N.Y. TIMES, July 20,
2008, at BU4.
31. We note, however, that means testing may provide a disincentive for saving in the
current period. See James Sefton et al., Means Testing Retirement Benefits: Fostering Equity or
Discouraging Savings, 118 ECON. J. 556, 588-89 (2008).
32. We do not consider all policies that exist to encourage savings. For example, a
description of the "saver's credit" is provided by Kamin. Kamin, supra note 1, at 16-17. Generally, the
credit provides a credit for amounts contributed to a qualified retirement account by those with income
below a certain threshold and without positive income tax liability. Id. The structure of the delivery of a
matching credit matters for the effect on savings. See Esther Duflo et al., Saving Incentives for Low- and
Middle-Income Families: Evidence from a Field Experiment with H&R Block, 121 Q.J. ECON. 1311,
1313-14 (2006). There are also tax preferences for homeownership (including I.R.C. §§ 121, 163(h) and
the exclusion from gross income of the imputed rental value of owner-occupied housing) and saving




of the decisions that people make. Understanding how and for whom current
policies affect savings and consumption decisions depending on the psychology
underlying these decisions is important for our project, and we will return to
this understanding when we re-evaluate these policies in Part IV.
Income contributed to a tax-deferred account, as part of an employer-
sponsored plan such as a 401(k) or an IRA, is generally not subject to tax until
that income is withdrawn from the account.33 From a revenue perspective, this
deferral is costly. Sixty-nine percent of private sector workers with access to a
401(k) plan participate in that plan,34 and the revenue cost to the federal
government is $80 billion annually.35 The effect of tax deferral is to increase
the benefit of saving by reducing the price of future consumption in terms of
foregone present consumption.36
Thus, tax deferral encourages savings through a change in the relative
price of future consumption.37 Rational individuals will tend to respond to this
price change and save more. However, individuals who are not fully rational,
perhaps because they are not aware of the benefits of deferral, because they are
33. I.R.C. § 408 (2012).
34. See Pew Charitable Trusts, Employer-Sponsored Retirement Plan Access, Uptake
and Savings (Sept. 14, 2016), http://www.pewtrusts.org/-/media/assets/2016/09/employer
sponsoredretirementplanaccessuptakeandsavings.pdf
35. See Kamin, supra note 1, at 3. In 2007, payments into 401(k) plans totaled $271
billion. See Teresa Ghilarducci, Joelle Saad-Lessler & Eloy Fisher, The Macroeconomic Stabilisation
Effects of Social Security and 401(k) Plans, 36 CAMBRIDGE J. ECON. 237, 239 (2012). Although some
scholars argue that tax incentives such as those available through tax deferred accounts through IRA and
401(k) plans are unjustifiable, Kamin argues that they can serve as a helpful member of a collection of
instruments for encouraging saving. Kamin, supra note 1, at 67-82; Shaviro, supra note 13, at 1218,
1224-27.
36. The effect of the deferral is an exclusion of the "normal return to saving," the
return generally available in the market, from the tax base by allowing deferral of tax on the amount
invested and on the returns on that original investment. See Kamin, supra note 1, at 15; see also Daniel
I. Halperin & Alvin C. Jr. Warren, Understanding Income Tax Deferral, 67 TAx L. REv. 317, 324-27
(2013).
37. Whenever one speaks of an incentive created by a tax expenditure, like income tax
deferral, it is natural to ask what the baseline is in determining whether it is proper to call the item a tax
"expenditure." For example, a low rate of tax on income from savings is not a tax expenditure under a
consumption tax, but it is under a comprehensive income tax. We are not concerned with the proper tax
base here. For discussions, see Joseph Bankman & David A. Weisbach, The Superiority of an Ideal
Consumption Tax over an Ideal Income Tax, 58 STAN. L. REv. 1413 (2006); Daniel Shaviro, Beyond the
Pro-Consumption Tax Consensus, 60 STAN. L. REv. 745 (2007); Joseph Bankman & David Weisbach,
Reply: Consumption Taxation Is Still Superior to Income Taxation, 60 STAN. L. REv. 789 (2007).
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present biased, or because the effects of the tax are not salient to them,38 are
unlikely to respond to this incentive.39
Another tax incentive for savings is the preferential rate at which certain
capital income is taxed. Whereas individual income is generally taxed at rates
up to 39.6%, income in the form of long term capital gain is taxed at a top rate
of 23.8%.40 This preferential rate increases the after-tax return to savings
invested in assets that generate capital gains, thereby reducing the cost of future
consumption in terms of foregone present consumption.41 Rational individuals
who respond to the lower price of future consumption caused by tax deferral
would also be expected to respond to preferential rates for long term capital
gains. On the other hand, as with deferral, individuals who are present-biased
will not respond much to this tax incentive. Of course, rational individuals do
not make errors in saving for retirement to begin with, so if it is desirable to
encourage savings by these individuals, then it must be to increase investment
and growth or because these individuals are likely to undersave for moral
hazard reasons.
Because of the limitations of tax incentives in reaching present-biased
individuals, there has been a surge of enthusiasm into savings interventions that
aim to make seemingly innocuous changes in the presentation of savings
choices that help biased individuals but have little, if any, adverse effect on
38. See Raj Chetty, Adam Looney & Kory Kroft, Salience and Taxation: Theory and
Evidence, 99 AM. ECON. REv. 1145, 1146-47 (2009); Amy Finkelstein, E-ztax: Tax Salience and Tax
Rates, 124 Q.J. ECON. 969 (2009); David Gamage & Darien Shanske, Three Essays on Tax Salience:
Market Salience and Political Salience, 65 TAX L. REV. 19, 23-59 (2011); Jacob Goldin, Optimal Tax
Salience, 131 J. PUB. ECON. 115 (2015); Jacob Goldin & Tatiana Homonoff, Smoke Gets in Your Eyes:
Cigarette Tax Salience and Regressivity, 5 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL'Y 302, 302-04 (2013); Jacob
Goldin & Yair Listokin, Tax Expenditure Salience, 16 AM. L. ECON. REv. 144, 144-52 (2014); Andrew
T. Hayashi, The Legal Salience of Taxation, 81 U. CHI. L. REV. 1443, 1447-49 (2014).
39. Some argue that ax incentives are ineffective at increasing savings rates. See, e.g.,
Ryan Bubb & Richard H. Pildes, How Behavioral Economics Trims Its Sails and Why, 127 HARV. L.
REv. 1593, 1630-32 (2013); Chetty et al., supra note 4, at 1144; Galle, supra note 5, at 883; Cass R.
Sunstein, Deciding by Default, 162 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 5-6 (2013). But see Daniel J. Benjamin, Does
401(k) Eligibility Increase Saving?: Evidence from Propensity Score Subclassification, 87 J. PUB. ECON.
1259, 1260 (2003); Alexander M. Gelbera, How Do 401(k)s Affect Saving? Evidence from Changes in
401(k) Eligibility, 3 AM. EcoN. J.: ECON. POL'Y 103, 119-20 (2011); Kamin, supra note 1, at 67-82; R.
Glenn Hubbard, Do IRAs And Keoghs Increase Saving?, 37 NAT'L. TAX J. 43, 49 (1984); James M.
Poterba et al., How Retirement Saving Programs Increase Saving, 10 J. ECON. PERSP. 91, 92 (1996);
Steven F. Venti & David A. Wise, Have IRAs Increased U.S. Saving?: Evidence From Consumer
Expenditure Surveys, 105 Q.J. ECoN. 661, 691-93 (1990). Others find that 401(k) accounts result in
shifted savings by high income households but new savings for low income households. Victor
Chemozhukov & Christian Hansen, The Effects of 401(K) Participation on the Wealth Distribution: An
Instrumental Quantile Regression Analysis, 86 REV. ECON. STAT. 735, 736, 750 (2004).
40. I.R.C. § 1 (2012). Long term capital gain includes both recognized capital gains
and certain dividends from domestic corporations. I.R.C. § 1(h)(11)(B) (qualified dividends). The stated
top rate for capital gains also incorporates the 3.8% net investment income tax. I.R.C. § 1411. The
realization requirement for gain from property also significantly reduces the tax on the return to saving.
See I.R.C. § 1001(a).
41. See Noel B. Cunningham & Deborah H. Schenk, The Case for a Capital Gains
Preference, 48 TAX L. REV. 319, 376-80 (1993); Evan Soltas, In Defense of the Capital-Gains





rational individuals.42 The most promising such interventions enroll employees
into 401(k) plans by default at some specified contribution level and provide
them with the choice to automatically save some portion of their future pay
raises, so-called "Save More Tomorrow" ("SMART") plans.43 Present-biased
individuals are likely to increase their savings under default enrollment and
with the aid of a SMART plan. Such individuals resist spending time mulling
over their retirement options and otherwise incurring current costs for the sake
of future benefits. However, neither default enrollment nor the option of saving
more tomorrow would be expected to affect savings rates for rational
individuals.
The third intervention into retirement savings choices is Social Security.
Social Security taxes are not themselves "savings," because Social Security is a
pay-as-you-go system with current workers paying the benefits of current
recipients. Benefits are keyed to an individual's earnings, not to payroll tax
contributions; however, those taxes are a function of earnings, so individuals
with higher lifetime earnings (and therefore higher Social Security taxes), are
entitled to greater benefits in retirement. Thus, although Social Security is more
accurately described as a contemporaneous ystem of tax and transfer than as a
form of forced saving, there is an implicit intergenerational bargain that, if
honored, trades current social insurance contributions for future income, much
like a forced savings program would. Social Security contributions are
mandatory, affecting all individuals regardless of whether they are rational or
biased. The individuals who are most likely to benefit from mandatory
contributions are impulsive individuals with present bias who, left to their own
devices, would save too little during their working years and might opt out of
default retirement contributions. Because it is mandatory, Social Security also
prevents rational individuals motivated by moral hazard from opting out and
exploiting the beneficence of society later in life. On the other hand, Social
42. See, e.g., Colin Camerer et al., Regulation for Conservatives: Behavioral
Economics and the Case for "Asymmetric Paternalism," 151 U. PA. L. REV. 1211 (2003); Sunstein &
Thaler, supra note 12.
43. Kamin notes that according to a recent survey, more than 50% of employer 401(k)
plans featured automatic enrollment in 2014, up from less than 10% in 2000. Kamin, supra note 1, at 17.
As of 2007, 39% of larger employers in the United States have adopted SMART plans. See RICHARD H.
THALER & CASS R. SUNSTEIN, NUDGE: IMPROVING DECISIONS ABOUT HEALTH, WEALTH, AND
HAPPINESS 116 (2008); see also Shlomo Benartzi & Richard H. Thaler, Behavioral Economics and the
Retirement Savings Crisis, 339 SCI. 1152, 1153 (2013). There is some evidence that the people who
enroll by themselves choose a higher rate than the default. See, e.g., Kelley Holland, AUTOMATIC 401(K)
ENROLLMENT'S DOWNSIDE, CNBC (2015), http://www.cnbc.com/2015/06/29/the-downside-of-
automatic-401k-enrollment.html. See also Bubb & Pildes, supra note 39, at 1618 (identifying how to
design defaults and other "nudges" to make people better off is more challenging than conventionally
assumed); Quinn Curtis, Andrew Hayashi & Michael A. Livermore, Tacking in Shiffling Winds: A Short
Response to Bubb and Pildes, HARV. L. REV. F. 127 (2013) (describing advantages of behavioral
approaches notwithstanding the difficulty of getting defaults right, the first time); Jacob Goldin, Which
Way To Nudge: Uncovering Preferences in the Behavioral Age Essay, 125 YALE L.J. 226, 260-70
(2015) (proposing a framework for collecting the information necessary to design such nudges).
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Security cannot help but may hurt rational individuals who, for entirely sensible
reasons, prefer to save very little at some point during their working years.
II. Savings Policy: A Macro Perspective
The micro perspective has dominated savings policy analysis by tax and
behavioral law and economic scholars. The key tradeoff in this approach is
between the benefits of individual consumption today and the benefits of
individual consumption in the future. The macroeconomic perspective on
savings is also rooted in the notion that an economy operates best when
households allocate their consumption optimally over time, but it posits a
tradeoff between aggregate consumption in the present and aggregate
consumption in the future. Lower consumption (and higher savings) today is
associated with more investment in productive capital that supports higher
levels of consumption in the future. Whether national savings is "too low"
relative to the optimum is an open question, but macroeconomists have pointed
to a range of reasons to suggest that raising national savings would raise
national welfare.44
The macro perspective, once a central player in evaluating tax law and
policy, has been largely neglected by tax scholars in recent years, but there are
glimmers of a resurgent interest in the field.45 Yair Listokin has argued both for
the need to bring the macro perspective back to tax scholarship,46 and for a
macro-based reconsideration of a wide variety of laws, including tax
expenditures.7 On the other hand, Eric Posner and Jonathan Masur have
argued for a more tentative and experimental approach to putting law in the
service of macroeconomic objectives.48 This Article contributes to this nascent
literature by providing the first application of the macro approach to analyzing
legal interventions into savings decisions, which we argue should be the focal
point for lawmakers concerned with how the law can help during periods of
deep recession when the traditional tools of business cycle management-fiscal
44. For a review, see Douglas W. Elmendorf & Louise M. Sheiner, Should America
Save for Its Old Age? Fiscal Policy, Population Aging, and National Saving, 14 J. ECON. PERSP. 57
(2000).
45. These "law and macroeconomics" articles include: Lily L. Batchelder et al.,
Efficiency and Tax Incentives: The Case for Refundable Tax Credits, 59 STAN. L. REV. 23 (2006)
(arguing for refundable credits in part because of their countercyclical properties); Jeff Strnad, Deflation
and the Income Tax, 59 TAX L. REV. 243 (2005) (showing that when there is persistent price deflation, a
tax on nominal payments and receipts is equivalent to a cash flow tax); and Zachary D. Liscow &
William A. Woolston, How Income Taxes Should Change During Recessions (Yale Law and Economics
Research Paper No. 538, 2016), http://papers.ssm.com/abstract=2752728.
46. Yair Listokin, Equity, Efficiency, and Stability: The Importance of Macroeconmics
for Evaluating Income Tax Policy, 29 YALE J. ON REG. 45, 49-50 (2012) [hereinafter Listokin, Equity,
Efficiency, and Stability]; Yair Listokin, Stabilizing the Economy Through the Income Tax Code, 123
TAX NOTES 1575 (2009) [hereinafter Listokin, Stabilizing the Economy].
47. See both of the Listokin articles in supra note 7.
48. Jonathan S. Masur & Eric A. Posner, Should Regulation Be Countercyclical?, 34




policy and monetary policy-are ineffective or politically infeasible. This is
also the first Article to bring together behavioral law and economics, which
focuses on the decisions of individuals, and the macro approach, which
analyzes how those decisions aggregate to affect the economic environment.
In this Part, we outline the traditional macro rationale for the tradeoff
between present and future consumption. We discuss the relationship between
consumption, savings, and investment as mediated through the interest rate. We
demonstrate why higher savings today is traditionally associated with higher
consumption in the future. We then discuss how and why the traditional logic
does not hold in a low-interest-rate environment, such as the one that has
characterized the United States for the last nine years. In particular, when
nominal interest rates are near zero, additional savings accumulate on the
sidelines of the economy as cash and do not lead to increased investment.
A. Savings During Normal Times
A household's savings is simply any income that is not spent on
consumption or paid to the government as taxes. A household with positive
savings must decide how to allocate that savings between different savings
alternatives. One option is to hold it as cash, or cash-like assets such as bank
deposits. Alternatively, the household can lend its savings to firms or other
borrowers at the prevailing rate of interest.49 Households prefer to lend their
excess income rather than hold cash whenever the risk-free interest rate is
positive, and they may also be willing to purchase some risky assets (e.g.,
stocks) in hopes of receiving a return that exceeds that rate. Therefore, when
the interest rate is positive, households hold cash only to facilitate transactions
but not as a form of savings.
The stocks and bonds purchased by households are the source of financing
that firms use for investment projects such as new factories, buildings, and
research and development, and the price that firms pay to obtain that financing
depends on the interest rate. As the interest rate falls, so does the cost of
financing new projects and so more projects become profitable. Therefore,
aggregate investment depends negatively on the interest rate. More household
savings puts downward pressure on the interest rate, which lowers financing
costs for firms and leads to more investment. That investment creates capital
(machines, factories, and buildings) that is used to produce goods for
consumption in the future. Therefore, higher savings (and less consumption)
today causes more investment today and more capital and consumption in the
future.
49. We refer here to the risk-free nominal return on holding bonds (e.g., making
loans). Households do not typically lend directly to firms or other households, but rather lend to a
financial institution which serves as an intermediary between borrowers and lenders. For simplicity, and
without loss of generality, we abstract from financial institutions in our analysis.
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Economic theories with fundamentally different underlying assumptions,
including those with Keynesian and neoclassical foundations, agree on this
relationship between savings and investment during normal times.
Disagreement arises over the extent to which higher spending (and lower
saving), by households or the government, reduces investment. For example,
soon after the Great Recession, well-known University of Chicago economist
John Cochrane wrote, "Jobs created by stimulus spending are offset by jobs lost
from the decline in private spending. We can build more roads instead of
factories, but fiscal stimulus can't help us build more of both."50 Eugene Fama,
a Nobel-Prize winning economist, echoed Cochrane's sentiments: "Stimulus
plans are funded by issuing more government debt. The added debt absorbs
savings that would otherwise go to private investment."5'
Although these comments refer to government spending, the rationale
applies equally to private consumption. This can be seen by observing that
national income (Y) can be decomposed into its expenditure components:
consumption (C), investment (I), and government spending (G):52
National Income Y = C + I + G (1)
The neoclassical view of the economy reflected in the quotations above
posits that national income is fixed by the technology, capital, and labor in the
economy.53 From this "supply-side" view of the world, national income is fixed
and any increases in consumption or government spending must be offset by
decreases in investment.54 As discussed above, the price that mediates this
change is the interest rate. Although it is controversial whether national income
responds to changes in consumption, there is widespread agreement that
economic theory generally predicts that higher savings is associated with higher
investment during normal times, when interest rates are positive. But when
interest rates fall close to zero, increasing savings will not necessarily lead to
more investment.
50. John Cochrane, Fiscal Stimulus, Fiscal Inflation, or Fiscal Fallacies? 2 (Univ. of
Chi. Booth Sch. Bus. Res. Paper, 2009),
http://faculty.chicagobooth.edu/john.cochrane/research/papers/fiscal2.htm.
51. Eugene F. Fama, Bailouts and Stimulus Plans, FAMA/FRENCH F. (Jan. 13, 2009),
http://famafrench.dimensional.com/essays/bailouts-and-stimulus-plans.aspx.
52. This is the National Income Accounting Identity, common in textbooks on
macroeconomics. We leave out net exports for simplicity.
53. Yalso equals aggregate production, which equals aggregate expenditure.
54. For a further discussion, see Daniel Patrick Murphy & Kieran James Walsh,





B. Savings Is Not the Same Thing as Investment
The textbook notion that savings is equal to investment is simply a
restatement of the national income identity given in equation (1).
National Savings Y - C - G = I (2)
s
The left-hand side is national savings: total national income that is not
used for private consumption or government spending. The equation shows that
it must equal investment. But national savings is not necessarily the same as
aggregate household savings. To see this, suppose that household savings, the
income left over after consumption and taxes have been paid, can be saved as
either cash/money (M) or used to buy corporate bonds (B). 55 We denote the
56price of a bond by Q, which varies inversely with the interest rate. If we add
up household savings across the entire economy and assume that government
spending is financed by taxes, we have the following equation:
Household Savings Sh = M + QB, (3)
To see how household savings relate to aggregate investment, it suffices
to note that the bonds held by households are the bonds issued by firms to
finance investment projects, so that QB = I. By making this change to equation
3, we get
Household Savings Sh = M + I (4)
Here we can easily see that aggregate household savings need not equal
investment. Rather, household savings simply equals the total value of
household assets, including both cash and claims on returns from firm
investment. In this simple setup, aggregate household savings only equals
aggregate investment under the assumption that households do not hold cash.
Under what conditions might such an assumption be reasonable? A bond pays
cash in the future. If the interest rate is greater than zero, then a household
earns more money in the future by buying a bond (lending to firms) than by
holding onto cash. In this case, M = 0, and the aggregate household savings
condition 4 is equivalent to the national income identity 2.
55. B is net household holdings of bonds that pay a unit of M in period t + 1.
56. We assign prices to bonds and other assets under the assumption that, while prices
of goods and services are fixed in dollar terms, asset prices can vary. Specifically, the price of a bond Q
is inversely related to the interest rate r. Q = -.1+r
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But now consider the implications for household savings of an interest
rate of zero. In that case, households are indifferent between holding cash and
lending to firms. Buying bonds yields the same future return as holding cash if
the bonds are risk-free. If there is some risk associated with bonds, then
households would prefer to hold cash rather than lend for firm investment. If
households save in the form of cash (or other assets that do not finance firms'
purchases of new capital goods), then aggregate household savings will exceed
investment. In that case, policies to incentivize saving will not increase
investment and future consumption.
An enormous amount of savings was held as "cash" rather than
productively invested during the Great Recession. From August 2008 to
January 2015, the amount of "excess reserves" held by banks with the Federal
Reserve, the amount held idle by those banks rather than lent out for productive
investment, grew from $1.9 billion to staggering $2.6 trillion.57 With market
interest rates so low, there was insufficient incentive for banks to lend the funds
out to the private sector.
C. Everything Is Upside Down at the Zero Lower Bound
We have seen that when nominal interest rates reach zero, at the "Zero
Lower Bound," increases in household savings need not (and in most
circumstances, will not) correspond to increases in aggregate investment.
Given the fairly straightforward logic behind this result, it is natural to ask why
the notion that "savings equals investment" is so prevalent that it is one of the
fundamental concepts taught in textbooks on macroeconomics.59
The short answer is that many macroeconomists perceived the probability
that nominal interest rates would fall toward near-zero to be extremely unlikely.
In traditional macro theories, two assumptions must be satisfied to break the
connection between savings and investment. First, prices and/or wages must be
relatively rigid, and many economists questioned whether the empirical
evidence on price rigidity was sufficient to worry about this. Second, central
57. See Ben R. Craig & Matthew Koepke, Excess Reserves: Oceans of Cash, FED.
RES. BANK CLEVELAND ECON. COMMENTARY 2015-02 (Feb. 2015); see also David A. Price, Where the
Newly Created Money Went, FED. RES. BANK RICHMOND ECON Focus 28 (2013).
58. Professor Listokin also argues that many concerns of the tax system dealing with
the value of deferral fall away in a very low interest rate environment. Yair Listokin, How To Think
About Income Tax When Interest Rates Are Zero, TAX NOTES VIEWPOINT 959, 961 (May 16, 2016). But
see Thomas J. Brennan & Alvin C. Warren Jr, Realization and Lock-In When Interest Rates Are Low,
152 TAX NOTES VIEWPOINT 1151,1154-55 (2016).
59. More specifically, there was skepticism about whether price rigidity was a strong
enough phenomenon to generate a theoretically important response of output to unanticipated changes in
the money supply (and corresponding changes in nominal interest rates).
60. Mikhail Golosov & Robert E. Lucas Jr., Menu Costs and Phillips Curves, 115 J.
POL. ECON. 171, 173 (2007). Similar concerns drove the debate over whether changes in monetary
policy-or other forms of demand shocks for that matter-could account for fluctuations in economic
activity. Many macroeconomists believed that changes in technology and labor supply alone (the supply




banks must be unable to commit to creating high rates of inflation in the future,
because high rates of expected inflation have the effect of lowering the real
interest rate and thereby increasing investment.61
As a consequence of the predictions of macroeconomic theories that
dominated in the latter part of the twentieth century, and as a result of the
period of relative macro stability that prevailed in the U.S. since the early
1980s, many macroeconomists believed that deep recessions were no longer
concerns for developed economies. As one of the leading figures in modern
macroeconomics, Robert Lucas, asserted in 2003:
[The] central problem of depression prevention has been solved, for all
practical purposes, and in fact has been solved for many decades. There
remain important gains in welfare from better fiscal policies, but I argue
that these are gains from providing people better incentives to work and
save, not from better-tuning of spending flows.6 2
The Great Recession that began in 2008 strongly challenged this view.
The eight years following the onset of the recession featured low capacity
utilization, high unemployment, and near-zero interest rates in the U.S. The
recession was not limited to the United States. Risk-free interest rates around
the world persisted near zero, reflecting a dearth of demand for goods and
services relative to the global supply.
The extended period of exceptionally high unemployment has led
theorists to revisit the Keynesian notion of the paradox of thrift-the idea that
attempts to increase aggregate saving cause lower economic output and even
lower investment.63 The logic is straightforward: a decrease in consumption
causes a fall in output, and if firms respond to low demand for their products by
reducing their planned investment, then a decline in aggregate investment can
exacerbate the decline in aggregate output and increase the amount of idle
resources in the economy. Such a situation is particularly likely at the Zero
61. Gauti B. Eggertsson & Woodford Michael, Zero Bound on Interest Rates and
Optimal Monetary Policy, 2003 BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON. ACTIVITY 139; Paul R. Krugman et al., It's
Baaack: Japan's Slump and the Return of the Liquidity Trap, 1998 BROOKINGS PAPERS ECON.
ACTIvITY 137, 162. Krugman et al. provides a broader assessment of the historical reasons for the lack
of attention to the Zero Lower Bound in macroeconomic research. Krugman et al., supra, at 137-38.
62. Robert E. Lucas Jr, Macroeconomic Priorities, 93 AM. ECON. REV. 1, 1 (2003).
63. There are different views of why private consumption drives output and incomes,
but they share in common the possibility that resources are wasted in the form of slack in the economy.
See, e.g., Gauti B. Eggertsson & Paul Krugman, Debt, Deleveraging, and the Liquidity Trap: A Fisher-
Minsky-Koo Approach, 127 Q.J. ECON. 1469 (2012); Pascal Michaillat & Emmanuel Saez, Aggregate
Demand, Idle Time, and Unemployment, 130 Q.J. ECON. 507 (2015); Pontus Rendabl, Fiscal Policy in
an Unemployment Crisis, 83 REv. EcON. STUD. 1189 (2016); Stephanie Schmitt-Groh6 & Martin Uribe,
Liquidity Traps and Jobless Recoveries, 9 AM. ECON. J.: MACROECON. 165 (2017). Murphy
demonstrates that persistent slack and the paradox of thrift can prevail even when prices are perfectly
flexible. Daniel Murphy, Excess Capacity in a Fixed-Cost Economy, 91 EUR. ECON. REV. 245, 245
(2017). The important assumptions are monopolistic competition and fixed (rather than marginal) costs.
Id.
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Lower Bound, when nominal interest rates cannot fall further to incentivize
firms to increase investment and employ those idle resources. Although interest
rates do not often hit zero, when they do they can linger there for a long time,
and the consequences can be disastrous, with effects that persist long after
interest rates have risen again.4 Thus, the magnitude of the problem is large,
even if it is relatively infrequent.
III. Savings Externalities
At the Zero Lower Bound, an increase in household consumption causes
an increase in income for other households. One way of conceptualizing this
effect is to model consumption as having a positive income externality, which
allows us to bring macro effects back into a simple micro analysis of the
consumption/savings decision. An externality is a benefit or harm from an
activity that does not accrue to the person who is undertaking that activity.65
For example, the adverse health effects from releasing toxic chemicals into a
common waterway are a negative externality, and the enjoyment that passersby
gets from the rose garden I maintain in my front yard is a positive externality.
The important feature of an externality is that self-interested individuals will
not take them into account when deciding whether to undertake an activity. As
a consequence, activities that generate positive externalities will tend to be
engaged in less intensively than is socially optimal, and activities that generate
negative externalities will be engaged in more intensively than would be
socially optimal.
As discussed in Part I, when people at one stage in their life fail to
adequately consider the benefits and costs to themselves at some later stage of
their life, activities can generate "internalities." Externalities are the effects of
an activity on other people, whereas internalities are the effects of an activity
on the same person. 66 When individual decisions do not account for
internalities or externalities, the market does not align individual incentives
with what is socially optimal.67 This misalignment can be addressed through
government interventions such as Pigouvian taxes or through a private solution,
such as bargaining between the individual engaged in the activity and the
individual bearing the externality.
Individual consumption at the Zero Lower Bound has a positive pecuniary
externality or, equivalently, private saving has a negative externality. The
intuition is simple: when interest rates are near zero, money that is spent on
64. See Laurence Ball, Long-Term Damage from the Great Recession in OECD
Countries, 11 EUR. J. ECON. & ECON. POL'YS: INTERVENTION 149, 150 (2014).
65. See HAL R. VARIAN, INTERMEDIATE MICROECONOMICS: A MODERN APPROACH
663-85 (9th ed. 2014).
66. See Hunt Allcott & Cass R. Sunstein, Regulating Internalities, 34 J. POL'Y
ANALYSIS & MGMT. 698, 698 (2015).
67. See ROBERTS. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 596-600 (7th




goods and services increases the real incomes of the people who sell those
things, making them better off. There are two reasons that this intuition, and the
negative savings externality, has been ignored in the tax and behavioral law and
economics literature on savings. The first is that this literature has adopted a
micro perspective on savings. This focus on individual welfare draws attention
away from the larger effects of savings policy on the economy and the business
cycle. The second reason is that the model of the macroeconomy that this
literature implicitly relies on is a neoclassical model in which output and real
incomes are fixed by the supply of goods and services in the economy and
increases in saving lead to increases in investment.
How does introducing a pecuniary consumption externality affect our
analysis of savings policy? In this Part, we describe a simple economic model
that demonstrates the basic intuition behind the consumption externality, shows
where and when it matters most, and helps structure our evaluation of the legal
interventions designed to encourage savings. The model also reveals the
collective action problem that exists in this environment, and suggests that
some individual behavioral biases should be left uncorrected, at least
temporarily.
A. A Simple Model of the Savings Decision
Suppose that an individual lives for two .periods of equal duration, call
them her working years and her retirement years. She will earn some amount of
income during both periods, and can both borrow against her future income and
save her current income at he same interest rate to finance more consumption
now or in retirement. She prefers more consumption to less consumption in
each period, but each additional dollar spent on consumption generates a little
less benefit, or "utility," to her than the dollar before.69 Her task is to decide on
a plan of how much to spend on consumption during her working years and
how much to consume during her retirement given her lifetime income, the
diminishing marginal utility of consumption in each period, and the fact that
when she is making this decision, she cares less about her utility in retirement
than she cares about her current utility from consumption.
Under these circumstances, it is rational for her to choose her
consumption during the two periods so that the additional benefit of another
dollar of consumption during her working years is just equal to the benefit she
would derive from saving that dollar for the future. She will save more if the
68. This simple model corresponds to some stylized facts about the Great Recession, in
which marked declines on consumption were observed and could be explained by declines in wealth and
pessimistic expectations about future income growth. See Mariacristina De Nardi, Eric French & David
Benson, Consumption and the Great Recession, 36 EcON. PERSP. 1, 1-2. This highly simplified model
generally ignores intergenerational considerations.
69. This is the conventional "diminishing marginal utility" of consumption assumption.
See ROBERT S. PINDYCK & DANIEL L. RUBINFELD, MICROECONOMICS 96 (7th ed. 2009).
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interest rate is high or if she cares a lot about her utility in retirement. If the
interest rate is just high enough to offset the amount by which she discounts the
value of her utility in retirement, she will plan to consume the same amount
during her working years and in retirement.70
The models of present-bias described in Part I assume that individuals
discount future utility too much. If an individual exhibits this bias, she will tend
to save less for retirement than she should. This error opens the door to the
possibility of government interventions that help her save the right amount and
overcome her bias. One feature of these models is that the rate at which the
individual discounts her utility in retirement will appear inappropriately high
from her perspective at any point in her life other than the point at which she is
deciding how much to save for retirement. Thus, the judgment that her saving
for retirement is too low has a sort of democratic pedigree, with respect to the
individual herself. In the remainder of this Part, we will say that the individual
is "present-biased" if she discounts her utility in retirement more than she
should in the sense just described. If she does not discount her utility more than
she should, we will refer to her as "rational." Of course, the world is not
divided into only two types of people, and it may be that most people are biased
to some degree. There is nothing lost in our analysis if one understands
"rational" to simply mean "less present-biased" than the "present-biased"
individual.
Suppose that there are two individuals in the economy, one rational and
one present-biased, and that both have the same incomes during their working
years and in retirement. The rational agent will save just enough during her
working years to ensure that she does not have a drop-off in her consumption in
retirement. The biased individual will not save as much, and instead consume
much more currently and have a corresponding fall in consumption in
retirement. The rational individual will have higher lifetime welfare. Note,
however, what this simple framework assumes: that incomes in working years
and in retirement are fixed and independent of the choices that each makes
about how much to consume now and later. The fact that incomes and prices
are fixed means that the choices of each individual can be analyzed in isolation
from the choices of the other, and government interventions tailored to each
individual can be evaluated solely in terms of their effects on that individual.
Once consumption externalities are introduced, all of this changes.
B. Consumption Externalities and the Collective Action Problem
Let's introduce consumption externalities to this model. Suppose that for
each dollar that an individual spends on consumption during their working
70. This simple model considers only the most common types of individual preferences
in legal literature on savings incentives. We ignore "target" savers who save a fixed amount of income
regardless and who are generally unresponsive to changes in the price of saving or other savings




years the income of the other individual rises by some fixed amount.7 1 The
optimal consumption pattern for individuals in an economy with this externality
involves consuming more in their working years than they consume in
retirement; yet, the rational individual will consume the same amount in both
periods.
On the other hand, present-biased individuals are already disposed to
consume more in their working years than in retirement. In a world without
consumption externalities this was a problem, but as long as their bias is not too
severe relative to the size of the externality, their consumption pattern will
more closely approximate the optimal consumption plan than rational
individuals are able to achieve. If the magnitude of their bias is just right,
biased individuals will in fact achieve the optimal amount of savings and
consumption.72 As a result, an economy filled with only biased individuals may
have higher lifetime incomes, and be better off, than an economy of only
rational individuals.
This example shows that biased individuals might be better off than
unbiased individuals when their working years are characterized by
consumption externalities, but this conclusion does not hold in all
circumstances. If the biased individuals are too biased, then they will consume
much more during their working years than is socially optimal.73 Thus, whether
it is better to be biased or not depends on the magnitude of the bias, not its mere
existence. Rational individuals will tend to be better off if the consumption
externality is smaller. If there is no consumption externality, then we are back
in a world in which present-bias only induces an inefficient allocation of
consumption across time. However, as the magnitude of the externality
increases, a bias toward present consumption tends to work in the individuals'
favor.
Now we can compare the effects of a government mandated savings
policy on rational and biased individuals. Our concern is that these policies are
based on a micro perspective that neglects consumption externalities. Such a
plan would set consumption during working years exactly equal to income
during those years. For rational individuals, this plan will not help them
because this is the plan that they would choose for themselves anyway. They,
like the government, would then be surprised to have more income in
retirement than they planned because of the consumption externality. And, in
71. The example could be changed, without any important differences in implications,
so that consumption by one person during the working years increased income of the other person
during her retirement years.
72. Specifically, biased individuals choose the optimal consumption plan if the factor
by which they discount the future satisfies G = f(1 - y), where y is the consumption externality and f
is the proper discount factor.
73. They will still end up with greater lifetime consumption than rational individuals,
but their consumption profile will be far too skewed toward present consumption, and they will not have
nearly enough left for retirement.
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certain circumstances, the mandated savings plan could even make rational
individuals worse off.74
For present-biased individuals, the answer to whether they will be better
or worse off under mandated savings plans depends on the particulars of the
economic environment and the individuals' preferences.7 5 Biased individuals
are more likely to be made worse off by the plan as the size of the externality
grows. Whether bias helps or hurts depends on how biased the individuals are.
If the individuals are only modestly biased, then mandatory savings will make
them worse off.
C. Collective Action Problems and Two Wrongs
Another way of thinking about the challenge created by the consumption
externality is as a collective action problem. Individuals will collectively be
better off if they all consume more during their working years than in their
retirement; however, from each unbiased individual's perspective it is
undesirable to consume more now than in retirement, so they will not
coordinate on the socially optimal amount of consumption. Biased agents can,
unwittingly, approach the socially optimal amount of working-years
consumption and overcome the collective action problem because their bias
compensates for the externality.
This happy outcome for biased individuals illustrates a more general
feature of "second-best" economic analysis. The idealized economy that serves
as the baseline for standard law and economics analysis has numerous features
that are not true in the real world. For example, the stylized model of the
economy assumes that all market participants have full information, that there
are no transaction costs, that markets are complete and perfectly competitive,
and that there are no externalities or internalities.76 Taken together, these
assumptions are sufficient to imply that the market outcomes of this stylized
economy equilibria are Pareto efficient (meaning that no one person can be
made better off unless someone else is made worse off) and any Pareto efficient
outcome (from among potentially many) can be implemented through lump
74. If there are a small enough number of individuals in a small, local economy, then
rational individuals will be aware that he any income they spend will in turn be spent by the recipient
and come back to the initial spender as yet more income. The mandated savings plan does not take this
boomerang effect into account and would make the rational individuals worse off. This only holds for a
small number of individuals. As the number of individuals in the economy grows, this effect disappears.
75. In the case discussed above with a small number of agents, the mandated savings
plan is more likely to make the biased individuals better off as the externality becomes maller and the
interest rate increases. Thus, in an environment with low interest rates and high externalities, biased
individuals will tend to do better than a mandated savings plan based on an assumption of no
externalities. Being more biased helps as long as the bias is not too big. See the Appendix for details.
76. See John 0. Ledyard, Market Failure, in 5 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF
ECONOMICS 300 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008); B. Lockwood, Pareto
Efficiency, in 6 THE NEW PALGRAVE DICTIONARY OF ECONOMICS 292 (Steven N. Durlauf & Lawrence
E. Blume eds., 2d ed. 2008); LAW & ECONOMICs 42-48 (Robert Cooter & Thomas Ulen eds., 5th ed.




sum wealth transfers. However, when any one of those conditions is not
satisfied, it is not in general desirable to attain the remaining conditions.77 The
implications of this "theory of the second best" are profound and affect the way
that policy should be made across many areas of the law.
A simple example may help illustrate this concept. Imagine that we live in
the stylized world described above with the following two exceptions. First,
suppose that manufacturing activities produce a negative externality in the form
of pollution. There will be an inefficiently high amount of pollution. Second,
suppose that there are high fixed costs to entry in the manufacturing sector, and
therefore the market is not perfectly competitive. The manufacturing firms have
market power, so the price of manufactured goods is higher than it would be,
and the amount of goods produced is less than it would be, in a perfectly
competitive economy.
Viewed in isolation, one might look at the market concentration in the
manufacturing sector as a problem that should be addressed by driving down
entry costs or breaking up the oligopolists in the sector to increase competition
and make the real world look more like the stylized world, the salutary effect of
increased competition being lower prices and increased production. Recall,
however, that this very same production generates a pollution externality. The
benefits of increased output and lower prices in the market for manufactured
goods need to be balanced against the inefficiency in the market for pollution.
And, in fact, if there is nothing that can be done about the pollution externality,
the best we can do under the circumstances may be to preserve the imperfect
competition. Making the market for manufactured goods better might make
things worse overall.
The relationship between present bias and consumption externalities at the
Zero Lower Bound has this flavor. A consumption externality during working
years represents a deviation from the assumption of the classical economic
model that results in an inefficiency in the allocation of consumption over time.
The present bias of individuals is also a deviation from the classical model that
leads to an inefficiently high amount of consumption in working years in a
world without consumption externalities. Viewed in isolation, each deviation
appears to make the world worse off, but the two imperfections taken together
might be better than only one. This is most clear in the case that biased
individuals are just biased enough to implement the socially optimal amount of
working-years consumption.
77. See Richard G. Lipsey, Reflections on the General Theory of Second Best at Its
Golden Jubilee, 14 INT. TAX PUB. FIN. 349, 351 (2007); R. G. Lipsey & Kelvin Lancaster, The General
Theory ofSecond Best, 24 REV. ECON. STUD. 11, 11 (1956).
78. We also assume that transaction costs prevent efficient bargaining between the
polluter and those affected by the pollution. R.H. Coase, The Problem of Social Cost, 3 J.L. & ECON. 1,
15-16 (1960).
79. This example is motivated by Peter Asch & Joseph J Seneca, Monopoly and
External Costs: An Application of Second-Best Theory to the Automobile Industry, 3 J. ENVTL. ECON.
MGMT. 69 (1976).
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But a world without externalities and without bias is the best of all
possible worlds, so perhaps we should ask if we can achieve it. Unfortunately,
despite the best efforts of fiscal and monetary authorities over the past nine
years, including experimentation with novel and previously unimagined
interventions such as the Troubled Assets Relief Plan or Quantitative Easing,80
the output gap has remained persistently high. Even when the economy returns
to full employment, nominal interest rates will likely remain low. As a
consequence, relatively minor fluctuations in aggregate demand can push the
economy back against the Zero Lower Bound. As Larry Summers has pointed
out, recessions will likely last longer simply because monetary policy does not
have access to its standard tools for fighting recessions when interest rates are
81near zero.
IV. A Macro Perspective on Savings Policy Design
In Part III, we argued that patterns of undersaving and overconsumption
that appear to be problematic from an individual perspective may in fact work
together to generate an overall outcome that is better for everyone. At he Zero
Lower Bound, it may be better for individuals to be present-biased than to be
rational. We arrive at this result because of the positive externality from
consumption and because of the fact that increases in savings do not always
yield increases in investment, which would also increase individual incomes.
This discussion, however, ignored the possibility of a role for government in
filling a deficit in private spending. As the simple accounting identities in Part
II illustrate, an increase in government spending could increase incomes. In this
Part, we argue that there are limitations, economic and political, on the ability
of the government to increase its purchases of goods and services at the Zero
Lower Bound that make it desirable to involve households in the project of
business-cycle management too.82 We then go on to evaluate the three kinds of
savings policy interventions discussed in Part I from a macro perspective, and
their efficacy at ramping up demand during periods of economic downturn.
80. Pub. L. No. 110-343, 122 Stat. 3765, 3767 (codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 5211-41);
TARP Programs, U.S. DEP'T TREAS. (last visited Feb. 2, 2017),
http://www.treasury.gov/initiatives/financial-stability/TARP-Programs/Pages/default.aspx. For
quantitative easing, see R.A., What Is Quantitative Easing, ECONOMIST, Mar. 9, 2015,
http://www.economist.com/blogs/economist-explains/2015/03/economist-explains-5; What Is
Quantitative Easing, BANK ENG. (last visited Feb. 2, 2017),
http://www.bankofengland.co.uk/monetarypolicy/pages/qe/default.aspx.
81. See Lawrence Summers, Reflections on the New 'Secular Stagnation Hypothesis,'
VOX (Oct. 30, 2014), http://voxeu.org/article/larry-summers-secular-stagnation.
82. In an open economy, one might wonder who gets the increased income that results
from an increase in domestic spending. There might be some leakage of this type, with domestic
spending leading to increased incomes abroad (although less so for large economies such as the U.S.),
but when the world economy is at the Zero Lower Bound the same analysis applies. Other countries




A. Can't the Government Fill the Gap?
The traditional Keynesian solution to the problems associated with the
Zero Lower Bound is to increase government spending, and when it is feasible,
we agree that it is the best way to stimulate demand. The increase in public
spending both directly absorbs the slack in the economy and potentially
increases private consumption by raising expected future income. However,
there are costs associated with government spending that prevent its use as a
tool for overcoming the Zero Lower Bound, each of which is associated with
debt accumulated by the government. According to the theory of "Ricardian
equivalence," higher government spending today is presumed to lead to higher
taxes in the future. Since households know this, they reduce their own
consumption so that they can save to pay the future tax liability, undoing the
benefits of government spending. If the government does not increase taxes in
the future to pay for its debt, then a default (or even the prospect of default) or
debt-reduction through inflation can have other adverse effects.
These views are sufficiently prominent that they have led much of the
push toward debt-reduction (austerity) in Europe and the United States. The
President of the European Central Bank forcefully represented the argument for
austerity when he stated in 2010, "[T]he idea that austerity measures could
trigger stagnation is incorrect . . . . I firmly believe that in the current
circumstances confidence-inspiring policies will foster and not hamper
economic recovery, because confidence is the key factor today."85
Rather than increasing government spending, fiscal policy since 2010 has
been contractionary both in Europe and in the United States. This spirit of
austerity ruled out a variety of deficit increasing interventions that could be
helpful in stimulating investment and consumption, such as investment tax
credits and tax holidays. Fears of the adverse consequences of adding to
already-high national debt levels have caused Japanese policymakers to turn to
alternative policy options in hopes of growing the economy.86 One of the few
83. See Daniel P. Murphy, How Can Government Spending Stimulate Consumption?,
18 REV. ECON. DYNAMICS 551, 551-52 (2015); Rendahl, supra note 63, at 1190.
84. See Robert J. Barro, Are Government Bonds Net Wealth?, 82 J. POL. ECON. 1095,
1116 (1974). Higher taxes may also cause distortions that reduce current and future aggregate supply
and, therefore, future consumption. See Christina D. Romer & David H. Romer, The Macroeconomic
Effects of Tax Changes: Estimates Based on a New Measure of Fiscal Shocks, 100 AM. ECON. REV.
763, 765, 797-98 (2010).
85. Interview by Elena Polidori, La Repubblica, with Jean-Claude Trichet, Pres., Eur.
Cent. Bank (June 16, 2010), http://www.ecb.europa.eulpress/key/date/2010/html/spl00624.en.html.
86. We also note that there are thorny intergenerational distributional concerns
surrounding deficit financing of government spending. Private savings are resources set aside by
individuals for future consumption, while national savings includes both private saving and government
saving (government surpluses or deficits). David Kamin argues that the questions of how an individual
spreads her consumption over time is separable from how the nation spreads consumption across
generations. Kamin, supra note 1, at 47. He further asserts that "private saving determines how
consumption is spread across a particular person's lifetime. National saving determines how the nation
distributes its consumption over time, including across generations." Id. For a discussion of
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remaining such options is to try to increase inflation expectations in hopes that
higher expected inflation will spur firms and households to spend today, in
anticipation of higher prices in the future. Despite policymakers' best efforts,
however, inflation expectations have remained anchored at low levels, and even
if inflation expectations were to increase it is not clear that private spending
would respond much.87
Historically, one alternative to the use of fiscal policy for macroeconomic
stabilization has been monetary policy. The objective of monetary policy is to
keep the economy near full employment while stabilizing inflation. To
achieve this goal, the Central Bank adjusts the monetary base to target interest
rates consistent with full employment. In normal times, the central bank
responds to a recession by lowering interest rates. The lower rates stimulate
borrowing and spending, which helps remove the slack in the economy.
Why did monetary policy not achieve its stated objective of low
unemployment in response to the onset of the Great Recession? Quite simply,
once nominal interest rates approach zero, central banks start to run out of room
to encourage spending by lowering rates. Lenders would prefer to sit on money
rather than lend it out, so even if the Central Bank floods the market with cash
or reserves (as was the case after 2008), the excess money does not translate
into additional lending. Indeed, this is the very problem with the Zero Lower
Bound.
Central banks are not totally without monetary tools for stimulating the
economy as interest rates approach zero. It is, for example, possible to charge
commercial banks on the reserves they hold at the central bank, driving short-
term interest rates below zero. Japan and Switzerland are among the countries
that have recently experimented with negative interest rates. Such interventions
are not silver bullets, however. First, it is not clear how far interest rates can fall
below zero before firms and households prefer to sit on cash rather than pay the
cost of negative reserves. Second, persistently low (and/or negative) interest
rates may be associated with financial stability concerns as investors search for
yield.89 For these reasons, the "zero lower bound" on interest rates can be
considered more of a reference to the challenges inherent in negative interest
rates rather than a reference to a strict bound at zero.
It is also possible for the central bank to purchase assets with longer
maturities to exert downward pressure on long-term rates, as evidenced by the
extraordinary quantitative easing measures undertaken by the Federal Reserve's
intergenerational concerns, see Daniel Shaviro, The Long-Term U.S. Fiscal Gap: Is the Main Problem
Generational Inequity?, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1298 (2008).
87. See Riidiger Bachmann, Tim 0. Berg & Eric R. Sims, Inflation Expectations and
Readiness To Spend: Cross-Sectional Evidence, 7 AM. ECON. J.: ECON. POL'Y 1, 31 (2015); David
Cashin & Takashi Unayama, Measuring Intertemporal Substitution in Consumption: Evidence from a
VATIncrease in Japan, 98 REV. ECON. STAT. 285, 296 (2015).
88. Mission, BD. GOVERNORS FED. RESERVE SYS. (Nov. 6, 2009),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/aboutthefed/mission.htm.




Quantitative Easing program. Such interventions also have potential
drawbacks. They raise questions about favoritism for particular asset classes
and may generate financial instability through similar mechanisms that are
associated with low/negative short-run rates. Perhaps most importantly,
experiments with quantitative easing in the U.S., Japan, and Europe did not
solve the problem of persistently below-target inflation and above-target
unemployment. Indeed, as Larry Summers argues in his articulation of the
Secular Stagnation hypothesis, "It may be impossible for an economy to
achieve full employment, satisfactory growth and financial stability
simultaneously simply through the operation of conventional monetary
policy."9
The limitations on the use of fiscal and monetary policy at the federal
level cannot be expected to be overcome at the state and local levels of
government. Many states have balanced budget requirements that effectively
rule out deficit-financed expenditures that could fill the demand gap,91 and
since state and local tax revenues tend to be more volatile than federal tax
revenues, the limitations tend to exacerbate business cycle fluctuations.92 States
and municipalities with legal limitations on the ability to finance have more
limited borrowing capacity and higher borrowing costs than the U.S. Treasury,
in any event, so it is impractical to expect state and local governments to play a
significant role in macro stabilization.93
90. Id.
91. See NAT'L ASS'N STATE BUDGET OFFICERS, BUDGET PROCESSES IN THE STATES
51-54 tbl. 9 (2015), http://bigherlogicdownload.s3.amazonaws.com/NASBO/9d2d2dbl-c943-4flb-
b750-Ofcal52d64c2/Uploadedlmages/Reports/2015%2OBudget%2OProcesses%20-%20S.pdf; see also
NAT'L CONF. STATE LEGISLATURES, NCSL FISCAL BRIEF: STATE BALANCED BUDGET PROVISIONS 2
(2010), http://www.ncsl.org/documents/fiscal/StateBalancedBudgetProvisions20l0.pdf ("Most states
have formal balanced budget requirements with some degree of stringency, and state political cultures
reinforce the requirements."); Yilin Hou & Daniel L. Smith, Do State Balanced Budget Requirements
Matter? Testing Two Explanatory Frameworks, 145 PUB. CHOICE 57, 78 (2010) ("[Balanced budget
requirements matter] to varying degrees . ... In summary terms, the technical requirements tend to exert
a more obvious pattern of effects than do the political rules . . ."). See generally Jeffrey Clemens &
Stephen Miran, Fiscal Policy Multipliers on Subnational Government Spending, AM. ECON. J.: ECON.
POL'Y, May 2012, at 46 ("Since almost all US states have formal balanced budget requirements, a large
share of their spending fluctuates pro-cyclically. When states enter recessions, their tax bases contract
and their safety-net expenditures expand. Compliance with balanced budget requirements can thus entail
significant reductions in capital expenditures and in spending on publicly provided goods and services."
(footnote omitted)); James M. Poterba, State Responses to Fiscal Crises: The Effects of Budgetary
Institutions and Politics, 102 J. POL. ECON. 799, 799 (1994) ("Unlike the federal government, most
states are constitutionally prohibited from using deficit finance over any prolonged period."); Henning
Bohn & Robert P. Inman, Balanced Budget Rules and Public Deficits: Evidence from the U.S. States,
Camegie-Rochester Conf. Series on Pub. Pol'y, Dec. 1996, at 13.
92. See, e.g., Arik Levinson, Balanced Budgets and Business Cycles: Evidence from the
States, 51 NAT'L TAX J. 715, 730 (1998). This is contradicted in part by Robert Krol & Shirley Svomy,
Budget Rules and State Business Cycles, 35 PUB. FIN. REv. 530, 531 (2007). See also Arik Levinson,
Budget Rules and State Business Cycles, 35 PUB. FIN. REV. 545, 548 (2007) (responding to Krol and
Svomy).
93. See David A. Super, Rethinking Fiscal Federalism, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2544, 2609
(2005). For further discussion of why states may not be well positioned to engage in stabilization policy,
see Brian Galle & Jonathan Klick, Recessions and the Social Safety Net: The Alternative Minimum Tax
as a Countercyclical Fiscal Stabilizer, 63 STAN. L. REV. 187, 195-205 (2010).
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In the absence of fiscal stimulus and effective monetary policy, it is
imperative to explore alternative ways to stimulate spending. Other papers in
this Symposium agree with the premise that the costs of inaction are enormous,
and they propose various regulatory changes (for example, the relaxation of
environmental regulations) that could stimulate investment. We propose that
directly stimulating consumption through the refinement of savings policy is a
natural policy alternative to what are otherwise the first-best options of fiscal
and monetary policy. An attractive feature of turning to savings policy is that
its objectives (adequate retirement income) are intricately tied to
macroeconomic stabilization: aggregate income today is related to aggregate
income in the future and hence the ability of the economy to support its
retirees. 9 In the remainder of this Part, we evaluate existing savings
interventions for how they perform in terms of increasing consumption at the
Zero Lower Bound and in terms of increasing savings when the economy is
booming. As currently designed, tax-advantaged retirement accounts and
behavioral interventions, such as contribution defaults and Social Security all
have undesirable ffects and require refinement.
B. Savings Policies as Automatic Stabilizers
The macro perspective of life at the Zero Lower Bound requires us to re-
evaluate the variety of interventions designed to increase savings. The key
implication of this perspective is that, in certain circumstances, savings can
create a negative externality. When governments are unable or unwilling to
increase fiscal spending to increase demand, private consumption may be the
only place that we can turn, and increasing savings may lower incomes for
everyone in the economy and make individuals worse off than if they could
have collectively agreed to spend more. Of course, because the economy cycles
in and out of such circumstances, this suggests that savings policy should vary
with the circumstances. When interest rates are positive and savings reliably
leads to increased investment, then it is in fact desirable to increase saving
because there is a positive externality from savings due to the effects on
national growth. The best savings policy interventions will be ones that
encourage savings when the economy is humming along but discourage saving
during deep recessions.
Before discussing the substantive details of what these policies should be,
we should ask how the law should implement a time-varying savings policy.
One possibility is that we rely on the discretion of policymakers to alter savings
94. Implementing incentives to increase investment will usually come at the expense
of government revenues and they might not be that effective. See Christine L. Dobridge, Fiscal Stimulus
and Firms: A Tale of Two Recessions 33-34 (Fed. Res. Bd., Finance and Economics Discussion Series
No. 2016-013, 2016), http://www.federalreserve.gov/econresdata/feds/2016/files/201 6 3pap.pdf.
David Kamin calls this disconnect between current policy and current economic conditions "policy
drift" and has argued for greater use of automatic adjustment mechanisms to close the gap. David




policy when circumstances warrant. The problems with such discretion are,
however, multiple.95
First, there are the present political circumstances which are characterized
by paralysis and a spirit of austerity which is at odds with the prescriptions of
the Keynesian economic approach that undergirds the idea that increases in
private or government spending are needed to increase real incomes. Even if
future governments' ideological disposition becomes more favorable toward
this view, contemporaneous political pressures may still prevent them from
implementing sound savings policy.
Second, even if we assume that governments function perfectly in
selecting the best policy in light of changing economic ircumstances, and are
not subject to the special interest, lobbying, or other public choice concerns that
distort policy choices away from the social optimum, governments are limited
by the timing of information that they receive and the pace of passing
legislation or implementing new regulations. The delays in information
collection, processing, and response create a mismatch between the timing of
policy and the underlying economic conditions that can exacerbate, rather than
mitigate, economic fluctuations.96
Finally, even if the best policy were available to a well-functioning
government in a timely fashion, it may still be preferable to identify the proper
responses to changing circumstances in advance and embed them in rules that
automatically adjust for those changing circumstances.97 If the costs of drafting
a rule that takes these contingencies into account in advance is less than the
95. For a thorough review of the advantages and disadvantages of various ways of
adjusting policy with changing conditions, see Kamin, supra note 94, at 168-202.
96. Mark Kelman, Could Lawyers Stop Recessions?: Speculations on Law and
Macroeconomics, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1215, 1304 (1993) ("[T]he considerable lags associated with the
reactions of policymakers, and the effects of these actions, make coordinating monetary policy with
economic reality difficult. By the time a tax cut or monetary shift is implemented, and by the time it
shows whatever effects it might have, it may well be unneeded or counterproductive.").
97. The tradeoffs between rules and discretion have been thoroughly explored,
particularly on the context of monetary policy. See e.g., Geoffrey Brennan & James Buchanan, Revenue
Implications of Money Creation Under Leviathan, 71 AM. ECON. REV. 347 (1981); Finn E. Kydland &
Edward C. Prescott, Rules Rather Than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal Plans, 85 J. POL.
ECON. 473 (1977). Although the issue of time consistency has been discussed in the monetary policy
context, there is also research on the effects in the fiscal policy setting. See, e.g., Zhigang Feng, Time-
Consistent Optimal Fiscal Policy over the Business Cycle, 6 QUANT. ECON. 189 (2015); Paul Klein &
Jos6 Victor Rios-Rull, Time-Consistent Optimal Fiscal Policy, 44 INT'L ECON. REV. 1217 (2003); see
also Davide Debortoli & Ricardo Nunes, Fiscal Policy under Loose Commitment, 145 J. ECON. THEORY
1005 (2010); Robert E. Lucas & Nancy L. Stokey, Optimal Fiscal and Monetary Policy in an Economy
Without Capital, 12 J. MONETARY ECON. 55 (1983); Mats Persson, Torsten Persson & Lars E. 0.
Svensson, Time Consistency ofFiscal and Monetary Policy, 55 ECONOMETRICA 1419 (1987); Torsten
Persson & Lars E. 0. Svensson, Time-Consistent Fiscal Policy and Government Cash-Flow, 14 J.
MONETARY EcON. 365 (1984). On the choice between fiscal rules and discretion more generally and the
incentives faced by governments, see Shanna Rose, Do Fiscal Rules Dampen the Political Business
Cycle?, 128 PUB. CHOICE 407 (2006); and Shanna Rose, The Political Manipulation of U.S. State Rainy
Day Funds Under Rules Versus Discretion, 8 ST. POL. & POL'Y Q. 150 (2008). The fact that
governments may be replaced by other governments will also affect their policy preferences. Torsten
Persson & Lars E. 0. Svensson, Why a Stubborn Conservative Would Run a Deficit: Policy with Time-
Inconsistent Preferences, 104 Q.J. ECON. 325, 325 (1989).
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costs of making discretionary policy periodically as these problems arise, then
it may be preferable to avoid the costliness of a discretionary approach for this
reason as well.98
If we want savings policy to adjust to changing economic circumstances,
but there are concerns about leaving it to the discretion of contemporaneous
policymakers to make these decisions, then perhaps it would be preferable to
embed state-contingent adjustments into savings policy at the outset. Done in
this way, so that economic downturns triggered an increase in private
consumption while booms triggered a decline, savings policy would tend to
stabilize output fluctuations without the need for government intervention at
that time. By hardwiring automatic adjustments that are triggered by economic
variables into the policies themselves, not only is it possible to overcome the
delay in implementation that would come from relying on Congress or
regulators to process information and amend the rules when the need arises and
to overcome the political paralysis that might make even desirable policies
unattainable, but it might also be possible to circumvent policy inertia when the
economy recovers. There is reason to be concerned that if people become
accustomed to the policy that is implemented in the depths of a recession that
they might be reluctant to permit a reversion to pre-recession policy. If this
reversion happens automatically, then it is less likely that recession policy will
persist beyond when it is desirable.9 This is not a complete panacea; if there is
sufficient political pressure then the "automatic adjustments" can be overcome
by legislation or regulatory changes. However, we think the importance of
mitigating the worst excesses of deep recessions are worth the potential cost
that recession policy will continue after the economy has recovered.
Certain government transfer programs already have the desirable feature
of being "automatic stabilizers." i0 Stabilizers are those features of "fiscal
policy that tend to mitigate output fluctuations without any explicit government
action."101 The stabilizing effects of these policies tend to operate on both labor
98. This tradeoff is also a feature of the rules/standards analysis advanced by Louis
Kaplow. See Louis Kaplow, Rules Versus Standards: An Economic Analysis, 42 DUKE L.J. 557, 560
(1992).
99. There is certainly a history of this phenomenon. For example, bonus depreciation,
which was implemented as an economic stimulus has been regularly extended year after year. Rebecca
N. Morrow, Accelerating Depreciation in Recession, 19 FLA. TAX REV. 465, 482 (2016).
100. Julia Darby & Jacques Melitz, Social Spending and Automatic Stabilizers in the
OECD, 23 EcON. POL'Y 716, 717-18 (2008).
101. Alan J. Auerbach & Daniel Feenberg, The Significance of Federal Taxes as
Automatic Stabilizers, 14 J. ECON. PERSPECT. 37, 37 (2000). Others have defined an institution as
having automatic stabilizing properties if the institution is permanent, well-defined in its objectives, and
operated by reference to variables that vary over the business cycle. See, e.g., WALTER P. EGLE,
ECONOMIC STABILIZATION: OBJECTIVE, RULES, AND MECHANISMS 46 (1952). As Ghilarducci et al. put
it: "an automatic stabilizer is only effective if it begins its compensatory effect without waiting for new
policy decisions or the recognition and implementation lags of discretionary fiscal policy." Ghilarducci,
Saad-Lessler & Fisher, supra note 35, at 240. Research on automatic stabilizers is focused on taxes and
expenditures, rather than savings policy. For a more comprehensive accounting of the stabilizing effects




supply decisions as well as aggregate demand,102 although the effect on demand
has received most of the scholarly attention and is most relevant for our
purposes, since it is consumption that exerts the positive externality on incomes
at the Zero Lower Bound.
When the business cycle is on a downturn and unemployment rises and
household incomes fall, automatic stabilization programs such as
unemployment insurance and temporary assistance to needy families ("TANF")
transfer resources from governments to households. There are also compelling
arguments that the amount of unemployment insurance benefits should increase
with the unemployment rate. 103 This additional income cushions household
consumption from falling as much as their earned income falls. As incomes
increase and the business cycle is on the upswing, these transfers are phased
out. The progressive rate schedule of the federal income tax has stabilizing
properties as well. As incomes fall, the share of a household's income that is
paid in taxes also falls, leaving them with higher share of their pretax income
available for consumption. Conversely, when incomes rise, the federal
government collects a larger share of households' incomes as more of their
incomes are pushed into higher tax brackets. By taking resources out of the
economy as incomes are rising, this reduces inflationary pressure on prices and
helps moderate after-tax income swings upwards in the same way that it
moderates after-tax income swings downward.
Apart from the progressivity of the income tax rate schedule, however,
very little legal scholarship has been devoted to studying the stabilizing effects
of the federal income tax. As Listokin points out, "[1]egions of tax provisions
have been carefully parsed from equity, efficiency, and simplicity perspectives,
but their impacts on the economy's stability are unexamined and thus unknown
and unnoticed."'1 This neglect of the stabilization properties of the tax law is
apparent in the casebooks that are used to educate law students as well as from
the analytic toolkit of policymakers.105 Listokin argues that "[t]he exile of
macroeconomic perspectives from consideration of tax policy was not simply a
matter of casebook editing. Rather, it reflected a widespread consensus in favor
of examining tax policy from a microeconomic- and not a macroeconomic-
perspective."'0 Notable exceptions are Batchelder et al.,107 which argues for
more widespread use of refundable tax credits for socially desirable activities in
part because of their ability to mitigate shocks to individual economic
circumstances and because they can prop up demand during economic
102. See Auerbach & Feeberg, supra note 101, at 38.
103. See Kory Kroft & Matthew J. Notowidigdo, Should Unemployment Insurance
Vary with the Unemployment Rate? Theory and Evidence, 83 REV. ECON. STUD. 1092, 1121-22 (2016).
104. Listokin, Equity, Efficiency, and Stability, supra note 46, at 48.
105. Id. at 56-58.
106. Id. at 58.
107. Batchelder et al., supra note 45, at 29.
777
Yale Journal on Regulation
downturns, and Galle and Klick,108 who argue that the alternative minimum tax
has desirable countercyclical properties. However, the de-emphasis on macro
stabilization over time is uncontroversial.
It is especially important to bring the macro perspective to bear on the
analysis of legal interventions into savings decisions, because the
savings/consumption choice is one of two crucial steps between policymakers
and household incomes and this choice has not yet been examined. The focus
of most countercyclical policies is how to increase the incomes of households
during economic downturns. The direct effect of these transfers is important,
but the total effect of these transfers on aggregate income depends on how
much of that income is consumed and how much is saved; this decision
determines how the initial transfers percolate throughout the economy from one
household to another, multiplying the effect of the initial transfer on incomes. If
households saved all the money that they received from the government, the
effect of the initial transfer on aggregate output would be severely limited.
Whereas other scholars focus on how to increase income transfers to
households from the government during downturns; we describe how the law
can help those transfers multiply most efficiently to generate additional income.
An important determinant of how those transfers multiply through
consumption decisions is the variation across households in how they respond
to income transfers; some households will spend government transfers and
some will save them.109 For example, on average 12-30% of the 2008 economic
stimulus transfers were spent on nondurable consumption within three
months.110 This aggregate figure, however, masks considerable differences
among households, with nearly half of households not spending any of the
stimulus rebate and 20% spending more than half, with higher-income
households with mortgages tending to spend the highest share of the stimulus
payment. 11 Households' incomes will prove to be an important factor in
deciding how to target savings policy interventions.
Another factor affecting the influence of household consumption on
incomes is the openness of the U.S. economy to imports and exports, which
will tend to cause some of the effect of increases in U.S consumption to accrue
to our foreign trading partners. However, since marginal savings has no effect
108. Galle & Klick, supra note 93, at 210-23. For a discussion of the limited
effectiveness of accelerated depreciation in stimulating demand, see Morrow, supra note 99, at 488-90.
109. More generally, savings rates are increasing through the entire income
distribution, and the marginal propensity to save is also greater for high income households than low
income households. See Karen E. Dynan, Jonathan Skinner & Stephen P. Zeldes, Do the Rich Save
More?, 112 J. POL. EcoN. 397, 400 (2004). The fact that households with higher incomes consumed
more of the 2008 stimulus rebate suggests that household debt also plays an important role in predicting
how much households will consume out of temporary income transfers.
110. Jonathan A. Parker et al., Consumer Spending and the Economic Stimulus
Payments of2008, 103 AM. EcoN. REV. 2530, 2531 (2013).
111. Kanishka Misra & Paolo Surico, Consumption, Income Changes, and





on economic output while marginal consumption does, any amounts spent on
local goods and services will have a positive effect; moreover, spending on
imported goods might still help to the extent that other countries use the
additional income to purchase U.S. exports, which is especially likely when
there is a global recession. The interconnectedness of the global economy does,
however, raise the specter of a collective action problem among countries
analogous to the collective action problem that creates the paradox of thrift at
the national level.
C. Evaluating Existing Policies
We have argued that policies designed to encourage savings that appear to
be ideal at the micro level may be counterproductive in a deep recession. In a
deep recession, the objective of encouraging individuals to save for their
retirement conflicts with the objective of stimulating spending. Here we discuss
how this new perspective on savings externalities changes our analysis of
specific savings policy interventions, by focusing on trade-offs between the
extent to which the policy helps individuals save for retirement, whether the
policy contributes to macro stability, and the revenue cost of the policy.112
Given these criteria, it is clear that we must consider how these savings policies
differentially affect households depending on (1) whether they are biased or
rational, and (2) their level of income and wealth. The table below provides a
summary of our policy recommendations depend on how these two
considerations intersect. We rank each group by the strength of the case for




Since present-biased individuals consume more currently out of their
incomes, increases in their incomes will tend to lead to higher multiplier effects
than increases in the income of rational individuals. Thus, present-bias is
helpful from a stimulus perspective both because of the initial effects of their
consumption on current demand but also because their disposition to consume
more currently generates a larger multiplier effect on initial income transfers.
On the other hand, present-biased individuals harm themselves to the extent
112. By limiting our focus in this way, we do not consider other goals of these
policies, such as that tax-preferred retirement accounts move the federal income tax closer to a
consumption tax base, or that Social Security helps fill a gap in the market for annuities, and that lower
rates on capital income reduce lock-in in the double taxation of corporate income. Moreover, we have
not conducted any simulations to estimate the magnitude of the stimulus effects we could expect from
these policies. Such estimates could only be generated by governmental entities such as the
Congressional Budget Office, the Joint Committee on Taxation, or others with access to macroeconomic
models and reasonable parameter estimates for assessing behavioral responses to the rules we propose.
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that they do not save enough for retirement, and inducing them to consume
even more currently than they already would will cause a greater welfare loss
to them than the welfare loss to a rational individual for inducing them to
increase their current consumption. Therefore, it will generally be better to
choose savings interventions that induce rational individuals, rather than biased
individuals, to consume more during economic downturns. Ideally, we would
increase spending by rational households that generates income for biased
households; the welfare losses to rational individuals will be relatively small
and the income externalities that accrue to the benefit of biased individuals will
have a higher multiplier effect.
Income and wealth considerations must also be taken into account in
setting savings policy from a macro perspective. One of the goals of retirement
policy interventions is to ensure that individuals' savings are sufficient to pay
for a minimum level of consumption during old age. Wealth levels upon
retirement are highly correlated with working-age income, so subsistence
retirement consumption concerns apply primarily to low-income households
but less so to high-income households (with the exception of those that are
extremely present-biased). Therefore, increases in working-age consumption
have the potential to threaten subsistence consumption primarily for low-
income households. Retirement policy changes that encourage current
consumption to stimulate the macroeconomy, therefore, are less threatening to
households' future ability to meet minimum retirement needs if the policy
changes are directed toward high-income households.
Income and wealth distributions also matter for assessing the net effect of
a policy change on the macroeconomy. First, individuals with different levels
of lifetime income may have different propensities to consume out of their
income,113 which will influence their response to savings policy interventions
and how effectively they multiply stimulus. Second, in an economy with
savings externalities, the socially desirable amount of consumption by a
household depends, in part, on the size of the benefit of additional consumption
to other households. The benefit to other households depends on how their
consumption path responds to additional income. Low-income households are
particularly likely to consume out of additional income, either
contemporaneously if they are credit-constrained or in the future if they use
current income to pay down debt (and hence relax their future budget
constraint).114 From this perspective, optimal policy during a deep recession
would incentivize consumption for wealthy households, which would increase
income and (current and/or future) consumption for low-income households.'15
113. See, e.g., Dynan et al., supra note 109, at 437.
114. See Appendix for a description of the optimal consumption plan for each
individual.
115. See Murphy, supra note 63, for a general equilibrium model in which





1. Tax Deferred Accounts and Capital Income Preferences
At the Zero Lower Bound, we would like tax preferences to cause
households to increase their spending to generate countercyclical effects.
Unfortunately, what limited evidence there is on this question suggests that the
opposite is the case. Ghilarducci et al. study net flows into and out of 401(k)
plans and find that they are procyclical, with more money coming out of these
plans during economic booms, aggravating cyclical volatility and acting as
destabilizers.116 Compounding the procyclical effects are the costs in terms of
foregone tax revenue. If the federal government's intertemporal budget
constraint is made worse as the tax base shrinks because of 401(k)
contributions, then the tax expenditure makes it more difficult for the
government to engage in its own fiscal stimulus.
Moreover, since only rational decision makers respond to the savings
incentives created by tax deferral and preferential rates, and rational individuals
already consume too little in the presence of a consumption externality, then
these tax incentives have exactly the wrong effect. Rational individuals should
be induced to consume more, not less, for the reasons described above; the
welfare loss from distorting their consumption plan towards present
consumption is less than the welfare cost of encouraging even more current
consumption by present-biased individuals. The way that these policies
intersect with the income distribution is yet another reason to disfavor them. Of
the households in the top fifth of the income distribution, approximately 90%
have retirement accounts.117 The corresponding figure for those in the bottom
two-fifths of the income distribution is approximately 13%. The benefits of tax-
deferred accounts accrue almost entirely to wealthier households, which are
precisely the households that should be induced to spend more during deep
economic recessions. By increasing savings among both rational households
and wealthy households, these policies get it exactly wrong.
How could we target tax incentives to increase spending during downturns
among the rational and the wealthy? One possibility is to induce current
consumption by disallowing or reducing the deduction for contributions to tax-
advantaged accounts when interest rates fall below a certain threshold or
unemployment exceeds some figure. Reducing or eliminating the deduction for
contributions to 401(k) plans and IRAs would tend to reduce savings by
rational individuals, but not present-biased or passive individuals. Because
contributors to these plans tend to be higher-income households, this would
also tend to increase spending by wealthy households, rather than low-income
households. Providing differential treatment for amounts contributed to an IRA
at different points in time could create a difficult tracing issue, an issue that
116. Ghilarducci et al., supra note 35, at 240.
117. 2013 Survey of Consumer Finances: SCF Chartbook, FED. RES. BD. 3 tbl.
"Percent of Families with Retirement Accounts" (Sept. 2, 2014),
http://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/files/BulletinCharts.pdf
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would become more difficult if we also wanted to tax the annual returns from
savings contributed during a recession. This issue does not seem
insurmountable; one could easily imagine segregated accounts within an IRA,
one within which investment returns are tax-deferred and the other one within
which returns are taxed under the normal realization rules. If this arrangement
is too easily evaded, or seems administratively impracticable, we might simply
disallow contributions to IRAs altogether when interest rates approach zero.
Although some of the amounts that would have been saved in tax-deferred
accounts may simply be saved in another vehicle, any income that is only saved
because of the tax deduction would be expected to be consumed.
Another option is to suspend the penalty for amounts withdrawn from tax-
deferred accounts or loosen the restrictions on borrowing against those
accounts. This would encourage rational individuals and wealthy individuals to
draw down their savings in these accounts to spend more. President Obama
proposed just such a policy late in the 2008 presidential campaign, but the
proposal was never implemented. However, a policy along these lines was
adopted by Denmark in March 2009 as a response to the financial crisis. The
policy reduced the tax applicable to withdrawals from the mandatory public
pension plan.118 If there are concerns that loosening restrictions on 401(k)
withdrawals or loans could adversely influence lower-income or biased
individuals, the policy could be made dependent on the individual having a
threshold level of savings in the account.
Retirement contributions are made by both households and their
employers, which might suggest relaxing the rules on pension funding during
recessions. Whether this would be effective at stimulating demand depends on
whether the funds not invested in the pension are retained on corporate balance
sheets as cash, where they are likely to stay in a low interest-rate environment,
or whether they are distributed as wages. In a recessionary economy with high
unemployment, we expect the former would be the case.
Another way to increase spending by only rational individuals and
wealthy individuals would be to have the tax rate applicable to the return to
new savings vary inversely with economic indicators, such as the interest rate.
For example, the tax rate applicable to gain on new savings could be higher if
the unemployment rates at the time that households invested the savings was
high. By limiting the tax rate change to only new savings, it would not
discourage the recognition of gains from earlier investments, which might be
desirable if gain recognition is associated with the liquidation of assets for
consumption purposes. On the other hand, the expectation that investment
income tax rates will fall during a downturn is likely to lead to strategic
investment behavior, with investors putting off investments until rates fall.
1 18. Walter Kickert, How the Danish Government Responded to the Financial Crises,




Although this effect could accelerate the descent into a recession, it would
reduce the magnitude of the recession.
A more drastic proposal that we think also merits attention is to eliminate
tax-deferred retirement accounts altogether, or at least for high-income
households. Whatever benefits that the accounts have in solving the
intertemporal undersaving problem by rational individuals could be outweighed
by the cost to the Treasury in foregone tax revenue and their procyclical
properties. Moreover, such accounts tend to be used primarily by households
whose savings is sufficient to fund retirement. While we acknowledge that the
preferential tax treatment may improve the savings choices of even wealthy
households, it is not obvious that these micro benefits are sufficient to
overcome the macro costs. First, higher savings by the rich pushes down the
income (and hence lifetime consumption) for the poor, consistent with the two-
person model described in Part III and in the Appendix. The effects are
compounded if broad categories of investment (including education) fall
because of low aggregate demand. Second, the lost fiscal revenues from the tax
deductions are significant, and even more so during deep recessions when
retirement contributions are not invested and demands on the social safety net
increase.
2. Default Retirement Contributions
The Zero Lower Bound also complicates how we think about the benefits
and costs of defaults and other nudge interventions across the business cycle.
Defaults have no effect on rational individuals. But if individuals are passive or
present-biased and do not update their consumption and savings plans when
there is a downturn that causes them to have lower incomes, then they will end
up saving a higher share of their income when their income falls. This means
that consumption is making up a smaller share of their income just as the
positive consumption externality arises, precisely the opposite of the effect that
we would want.
Whether 401(k) default contributions are set in fixed dollar terms, or as a
fixed share of earnings, they will tend to be procyclical. In the case of default
contributions that are made in fixed dollar increments, as the aggregate pre-tax
income of passive individuals increases, through either higher wages or
increased employment, 401(k) savings as a share of that income falls.
Conversely, as the aggregate income of passive individuals falls, either because
real wages are falling or unemployment is on the rise, 401(k) contributions as a
share of income rise. If 401(k) contributions are set as a percentage of pre-tax
income, the share of income that is saved remains constant. In neither case does
the default help increase spending during deep recessions and decrease it
during booms.
119. See Murphy, supra note 11, at 2.
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It is worth noting that the details of how the default is set and how (if at
all) it adjusts over time are crucially important, because it will effectively
determine the path of savings and consumption for passive individuals.
Because of this, the micro-perspective agrees with the macro-perspective that
default rates of retirement savings should vary over time. From the micro
perspective, individual consumption should be relatively stable over time, and
not respond much to temporary changes in income. On this view, someone
should save almost all of any temporary increase in income, such as an
unusually large bonus, and only make substantial changes to her consumption if
she gets a raise or other "permanent" increase in her income. Against this
baseline, a savings plan that saves a fixed amount of income is provides a very
crude approximation of the optimal consumption plan. Thus, even from the
micro perspective, there is a case that the default savings rate should fluctuate
with individuals' incomes over their working life. 120
But the macro case for lowering default contributions during recessions is
not as strong as the case for phasing out deductions for contributions to 401 (k)s
and IRAs, precisely because defaults only affect biased individuals. Although
we want to increase private spending during recessions, we would like that
spending to come from rational individuals because biased individuals are
already saving too little for retirement, and nudging them toward even more
current consumption is more harmful to them than it is for rational individuals.
If we were to stop our analysis here, we might conclude that default
contribution levels need not vary over time to account for the consumption
externality, but the fact that savings defaults are invariably connected with
401(k)s suggests that there is a more targeted approach could make sense
because wealthier households are both the ones who should be induced to
consume during economic downturns and the ones who have such retirement
accounts. For this reason, a better policy would be to have the default
contribution rate for only higher-income households vary with economic
conditions. For such households, the default contribution rate could be tied to
some national indicator, falling when the interest rate approaches zero or local
unemployment exceeds a specified threshold, for example. This approach
would induce consumption from present-biased, but relatively wealthy
individuals. Although not as well-targeted as manipulating the rules for tax-
deferred accounts, there may be a small role for defaults to play, especially
during deep recessions.121
120. Bubb and Pildes have noted that one problem with making default contributions
contingent on individuals' earnings histories is that those histories are not currently observable to other
employers, so when an individual changes jobs, there is no ready way for the employer to calibrate
default contributions. Bubb & Pildes, supra note 39, at 1622-23. We might also worry about whether
employers will set the default at the socially optimal level. See Ryan Bubb, Patrick Corrigan & Patrick
L. Warren, A Behavioral Contract Theory Perspective on Retirement Savings, 47 CONN. L. REV. 1317,
1353-55 (2014).
121. Our analysis of the effects of changing defaults assumes, as we do throughout the





For many households, Social Security is their primary source of income in
retirement.122 Social Security has two aspects: the Social Security tax imposed
on earned income and Social Security benefits distributed in retirement.
Although the distribution of Social Security benefits, and the program as a
whole, is progressive, the Social Security payroll tax itself is regressive.123 The
Social Security portion of Federal Insurance Contributions Act ("FICA") taxes
equal to 12.4% of wages up to $127,200, above which no tax is imposed, with
6.2% representing the employer portion and 6.2% representing the employee
portion, it being generally understood that the economic incidence of the
employer portion of FICA taxes is borne by the employee. This means that
Social Security contributions are a fixed percentage of earnings as those
earnings increase, until earnings cross the $127,200 threshold, from which
point Social Security contributions make up smaller and smaller shares of the
individual's earnings. When wages increase, the share of wages that is saved
through Social Security falls, and when earnings fall, the share of earnings that
is saved through Social Security remains constant or increases.
Thus, FICA taxes in general, but especially Social Security contributions,
have procyclical effects and withdraw a larger share of an individual's income
from potential consumption as that income falls. Since Social Security applies
on a mandatory basis to all wage-earners, the stakes for getting Social Security
right and using it properly as a stabilizer are much higher. Yet, rather than
acting as automatic stabilizers, reducing tax burdens as incomes fall, payroll
taxes have the opposite effect, potentially exacerbating the effects of an
economic downturn by withdrawing a larger share of income from the
economy just when it is most needed.124 Thus, as currently designed, Social
Security taxes do not help mitigate the savings externality problem during
recessions and, in fact, makes it worse.
Making payroll taxes progressive would be one way to introduce
additional stabilizing features into the program. In particular, when more
people experience low income in a recession, their take-home pay (as a fraction
of income) would increase, potentially stimulating spending and helping
remove slack in the economy. Conversely, savings rates would automatically
savers even as their default contributions are manipulated. This may not be accurate. For example, it
could be the case that as default contributions increase households pay greater attention and become less
passive. However, at this point in time we do not have a good understanding of how these biases evolve.
122. U.S. GOV'T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-419, RETIREMENT SECURITY:
MOST HOUSEHOLDS APPROACHING RETIREMENT HAVE Low SAVINGs 7 (2015),
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/670153.pdf.
123. On net, Ghilarducci et al. find that Social Security is countercyclical. Ghilarducci
et al., supra note 35, at 240.
124. Goldin and Lawson show that when there are active and passive decision makers,
defaults and tax incentives are often preferable to mandates. Jacob Goldin & Nicholas Lawson, Defaults,
Mandates, and Taxes: Policy Design with Active and Passive Decision-Makers, 18 AM. L. ECON. REV.
438, 453-54 (2016).
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increase in economic expansions, reducing pressure on prices and funneling
resources towards investment. A more progressive Social Security structure
could therefore help achieve both the micro objective of retirement security and
the macro stabilization objective.
Conclusion
Law and Economics scholarship, including tax scholarship using an
economic framework, has focused almost exclusively on the microeconomic
effects of laws on individual actors and markets. Yet laws tend to be generally
applicable, and the aggregate effects of these laws can have macro effects that
complicate or even undermine the conclusions of a purely micro analysis. By
bringing a macro perspective to the literature on savings policy we show that
the effects of legal interventions into savings decisions are more complicated
than the received wisdom would suggest. In particular, at certain times, the
private vice of overconsumption is actually a public virtue, generating higher





Consider the case of two individuals, i and j, both of whom live two
periods, 1 and 2. Each individual has the following intertemporal objective
function of consumption:
max [u(c) + fu(C2)]
where fl E [0,1]. Each individual also faces the lifetime budget constraint
cl + < y, + , where ct and yt are consumption and income in period t,R- R
and R is the gross rate of return on savings in period 1. We assume that the
price of consumption is I in both periods and that both individuals can lend and
borrow at the same interest rate. The optimal consumption plans, and the plans
chosen by the individuals themselves, satisfy the condition u'(c*) = Rgu'(c*).
An individual who is present-biased so that P < f will choose a consumption
plan that results in overconsumption in period I and underconsumption in
period 2. An individual who is unbiased has P = fl.
Suppose that the income of each individual in period 1 depends on the
consumption of the other person in period 1, so that yit = yi + yci,j where
y G (0,1) is the consumption externality (and vice versa switching subscript i
with subscript j). Now, the social welfare maximizing plan satisfies u'(cij) =
Rfl[u'(c*ig) - yu'(c2J)]. In the case that the two agents in the economy are
identical, the optimal plan is u'(c*) = Rfl(1 - y)u'(c*). Relative to this social
optimum, the consumption plans chosen by unbiased individuals will result in
too much saving and too little consumption in period 1. This welfare loss
increases with the social welfare weight attached to period 2 utility, the interest
rate, and the size of the consumption externality. The welfare loss also
increases as the marginal utility of period two consumption increases, as it
would be the case at lower levels of lifetime income. In the presence of a
current-period consumption externality, biased individuals might achieve a
higher level of welfare than rational individuals. In particular, present-biased
individuals will choose the socially optimal amount of period 1 consumption if
fl = fl( - y).
An Example
To illustrate the welfare effects, suppose that u(c) = In(c) and that both
individuals have the same income y in each period (before taking consumption
externalities into account), and let a = < 1. Assume that both individuals are
identical. The social welfare maximizing consumption plans satisfy c =
C2 , which in this case means that:
Rfl(1-v)
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y(R + 1) fly(R + 1)
1 R (1 - y) (1 + fl) 1 2 f
Note that cl > c; if Rfl(1 - y) < 1. Thus, the optimal consumption plan
allocates more consumption to period 1 than period 2 as the interest rate or
discount factors on future utility falls, or as the consumption externality
increases. What will the individuals actually choose? If the individuals are
identical they will choose the same consumption plans:
.* = y(R + 1) * apy(R + 1)
R(l+a _y)' 2 1+ /-
Consider first the case without consumption externalities. If y = 0, then
an individual who is unbiased so that a = 1 will choose the social welfare
maximizing plan. If an individual is biased so that a < 1, then she will
consume more in period 1 than would be optimal, so bias is unambiguously
welfare reducing.
Consider now the case with consumption externalities, where y > 0.
Consumption will be greater in both periods because lifetime incomes are
greater. However, in the presence of a consumption externality, the biased
agents might be better off than the unbiased individuals. The additional utility
that accrues to rational individuals over biased individuals in the presence of
consumption externalities is given by:
UP - = (1 + fl)ln ()+ l n
Note that the term on the left is negative and that the term on the right is
positive. Whether biased or rational individuals are better off in terms of
lifetime welfare in the presence of consumption externalities depends on the
specific parameters of the problem, but biased agents are more likely to be
better off as the magnitude of the consumption externality increases, and this
effect of the externality is increasing in the individual's bias. The partial effects
of the parameters on the excess utility of rational individuals is given by:
8 /(1 + )(a - 1)
< 0
9y (1+1 -y)(1+a 3 -y)
82 fl(1+1f)
> 0
ay8a (1 + afl - y) 2
8 fl(a+y-1)




The direct effect of a is < 0 if a < 1 - y. That is, as long as a is
sufficiently close to 1, greater bias is actually welfare enhancing. And, as the
size of the externality increases, so does the size of the optimal bias. What then
is the effect of enforcing an "optimal" savings policy on all agents calibrated
based on the classical model without consumption externalities? Under such a
policy, individuals would consume cl = y and would then be surprised to
consume C2 = y(l + y). The effect of enforcing this plan depends on what we
assume about whether individuals know about the externality or not. If
individuals know about the externality, the utility from choosing optimally less
the utility from the prescribed plan is:
R+1a(R 1
U* - UP = In R+1 + in aIn(R+1)
R( +a- y)) (1+a-y)(1+y)
This is strictly positive for rational individuals, but may be positive or
negative if the individuals are biased. That is, a policy that does not take into
account the externality when setting current savings levels will do worse than
rational individuals who take the externality into account and may do worse
than biased individuals who take the externality into account. The comparative




ay 1 + afl - y
a2  -A(1+ fl)
ayaa (1+a3- y)2
a fl(l - a-y)
aa a( + afl- y))
Biased individuals will tend to be better off, relative to the prescribed
plan, as the interest rate falls and the size of the externality increases. More
biased individuals will benefit even more from a larger externality. The direct
effect of bias on the welfare of biased individuals relative to the prescribed plan
is ambiguous, but positive as long as a is sufficiently large (greater than 1 -
y). But perhaps the assumption that individuals act with knowledge of
externality but government does not is incorrect. If rational individuals do not
know about the externality, then they will choose the same consumption pattern
mandate by the government: cl = y; C2 = y(1 + y). If they are biased, then
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y(R+1) y(R+1)(apl+y)
they will choose the pattern cl = y(R+1) , C2 = . The utility fromR(1 +apl) 1+ap
this plan less the utility from the prescribed plan is:
R(R + 1)(a3 + y)
(R(1+ apf) (( 1 +y)(1 + afi)
This quantity could be greater or less than zero. That is, it may make
biased individuals better or worse off to put them on the prescribed savings
plan, even if they are unaware of the externality. The comparative statics are as
follows:
a Rfl - 1
aR R(R + 1)




a /82 (- a-y)- fly
aa (afl+y)(1+afl)
As before, the benefits of being biased are increasing in the size of the
externality, so that the marginal effect of the externality on the welfare of
biased agents is greater at higher levels of bias. The partial effect of bias is
ambiguous in its direction. Bias is helpful, that is a < 0 if a > 1 y(.+1)
Note that the threshold at which bias becomes harmful is a larger amount of
bias (lower a) than when the biased agents are aware of the externality. The
effect of the interest rate on the benefits of being biased are ambiguous. If
interest rates are sufficiently high so that Rfl > 1, then higher interest rates will
help biased agents. If interest rates are low so that RJ. < 1, then higher interest
rates will hurt biased agents.
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